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THE RETURN OF NONCONGRUENT
EQUAL PROTECTION
Brian Soucek*
Contemporary equal protection doctrine touts the principle of
congruence: the notion that equal protection means the same thing whether
applied to state or to federal laws. The federalism-tinged equal protection
analysis at the heart of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in United States v.
Windsor, however, necessarily violates the congruence principle.
Commentators and courts—especially those deciding how Windsor’s
federalism should affect the ever-growing number of state same-sex
marriage cases—have so far failed to account for Windsor’s noncongruent
equal protection, much less ask whether noncongruence is generally
desirable, and if so, what form it should take.
This Article draws answers to those questions from the Supreme Court’s
alienage discrimination cases, which offer three distinct models of
noncongruence, each of which is reflected in Windsor. The alienage cases
show that instead of applying different levels of scrutiny to federal and state
laws, a better understanding of noncongruence would allow different levels
of government to assert different interests in defending their laws. By
reconstructing and evaluating the ways that structure and rights intersect in
the alienage cases, this Article considers for the first time what the return of
noncongruent equal protection could mean both for cases that follow
Windsor and for equal protection doctrine more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION
Federalism clearly plays a role in United States v. Windsor, 1 the decision
striking down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act.2 It’s just not
entirely clear what that role is. 3
The Windsor Court refused to treat federalism concerns 4 as an
independent ground for its decision: Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the

1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)) (“In
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife.”). Since only Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was at issue in
Windsor, and is at issue here, I refer to that section simply as “DOMA” in all that follows.
3. See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(“[N]o one questions the power of the States to define marriage (with the concomitant
conferral of dignity and status), so what is the point of devoting seven pages to describing
how long and well established that power is? Even after the [majority] opinion has formally
disclaimed reliance upon principles of federalism, mentions of ‘the usual tradition of
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage’ continue. What to make of this?
The opinion never explains.”).
4. As discussed below, see infra Part I.A, these concerns were raised in one of the
lower-court opinions striking down DOMA and in an amicus brief filed by a prominent
group of federalism scholars. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010); Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 2–3, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12–307) [hereinafter
Federalism Scholars’ Brief] (“DOMA falls outside Congress’s powers. Marriage is not
commercial activity, and DOMA is not limited to federal-benefit programs that might rest on
the Spending Clause. Any action by Congress that falls outside its specifically enumerated
powers must be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and DOMA cannot pass
that test. DOMA’s definition of marriage is not ‘incidental’ to an enumerated power . . . .”).
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majority found it “unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on
state power”—DOMA’s limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples—
“is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance.” 5
And yet Justice Kennedy also emphasized that “[t]he State’s power in
defining the marital relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart
from principles of federalism.” 6 Though the dissenters dismissed such
statements as “federalism noises” 7 or mere “whiffs of federalism,” 8 the
Windsor Court itself described states’ traditional power over marriage as
centrally relevant to DOMA’s unconstitutionality. But relevant how, and to
what provision of the Constitution? 9
In the months since Windsor was decided, scholars have offered answers
to those questions—answers that push beyond the temptation to dismiss
Justice Kennedy’s reliance on state power as hopelessly muddled. 10 The
most convincing readings to have emerged describe an equal protection
analysis tinged by federalism, or, as the First Circuit described it in its own
encounter with DOMA, an equal protection “uniquely reinforced by
federalism concerns.” 11 According to these readings, laws that are unusual
within our federal system are said to trigger somewhat heightened equal
protection scrutiny. 12 Moreover (or alternatively), when scrutinized, those
measures can be justified based only on aims that are deemed appropriate—
again, under our federalism—to that specific level of government. 13
5. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (majority opinion). While officially the Court merely
declined to decide whether DOMA exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers, it also
described as “established” Congress’s power to depart from state determinations of marital
status when it comes to, for example, immigration law and Social Security benefits. See id.
at 2690.
6. Id. at 2692 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting).
9. Cf. id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The sum of all the Court’s nonspecific handwaving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equal-protection grounds, maybe on substantivedue-process grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous federalism component playing a
role) . . . .”).
10. Cf. Ernest A. Young, United States v. Windsor and the Role of State Law in Defining
Rights Claims, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 39, 40 n.4 (2013) (citing descriptions of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion as “muddled,” intellectually awkward, and a “logical mishmash”).
Others have described Windsor as strategically ambiguous rather than simply muddled. See,
e.g., Neil Siegel, Federalism As a Way Station: Windsor As Exemplar of Doctrine in
Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 7 (2014) (“Overall, the majority opinion defies decisive
interpretation . . . . [I]t seems to insist on preserving for itself a certain Delphic obscurity.”).
11. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.
2012).
12. See Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism, and Family Equality, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 156, 163 (2013), available at http://columbialawreview.org/windsorfederalism-and-family-equality (“[T]he departure from the traditional allocation of power
was not an independent ground for striking down the statute; the fact that the statute was
unusual was simply a trigger for more careful review under principles of equal protection.”).
13. Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United
States v. Windsor, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117, 137 (“Federalism also constrained the
interests that could justify DOMA by tightening the Court’s standard of review and
prompting the Court to reject Congress’s primary interest outright.”); see also Will Baude,
Federalism
and
DOMA,
PRAWFSBLAWG
(June
26,
2013,
1:45
PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/federalism-and-doma.html (“Windsor is
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Compelling and correct as I think they are, these readings miss one
crucial point: that federalism-tinged equal protection scrutiny necessarily
violates a core tenet of contemporary equal protection doctrine—the
principle of congruence. Congruence requires that state and federal laws be
subjected to the same scrutiny. Named and reaffirmed by Justice O’Connor
in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 14 the congruence principle reflects the
“long-held notion that ‘it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government’ than it does on a
State to afford equal protection of the laws.”15 Congruence means that
“[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that
under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 16
Windsor’s federalism-tinged equal protection is noncongruent by nature:
it calls for different scrutiny depending on whose classification is being
scrutinized. Commentators, however, have thus far failed to notice that
Windsor flouts the congruence principle’s unitary view of equal protection.
The Windsor opinion seems to require that which the Court has elsewhere
described as “unthinkable.” 17
And yet, the unthinkable has previously been thought. Despite the
Court’s professed allegiance to the congruence principle, one bastion of
noncongruence still remains, sometimes unnoticed, 18 within equal
protection doctrine. 19 This is the law concerning alienage discrimination.20
an equal protection decision to which federalism is relevant, both because it shores up the
interest on Windsor’s side and it diminishes or eliminates many of the interests on the
federal government’s side.”).
14. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
15. Id. at 225 (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)).
16. Id. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)); see also Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment
equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Adarand overruled the short-lived holding of Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which had examined federal affirmative
action programs under intermediate scrutiny while subjecting state affirmative action
programs to strict scrutiny. Since Adarand, affirmative action programs have been subjected
to strict scrutiny whether they are state or federal. For a sophisticated discussion of the
congruence principle’s theoretical underpinnings—and arguments for why the congruence
principle should not always be followed—see Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case
for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (2005).
17. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
18. In its opinion striking down Wisconsin’s ban on same-sex marriage, the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, for example, said that it was unaware of any
cases “in which the [Supreme] Court applied equal protection principles differently to state
and federal government.” Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1017 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
19. Alienage may be the one area in which noncongruence is made explicit, but as Adam
Winkler has shown, judges sometimes scrutinize laws noncongruently in practice without
acknowledging that they are doing so. See Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108
MICH. L. REV. 153 (2009) (finding a “degree of sliding-scale deference in free speech cases”
that is harsher on local and state laws than on federal laws that restrict speech); Adam
Winkler, The Federal Government As a Constitutional Niche in Affirmative Action Cases, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1931 (2007) (finding courts more likely to uphold federal affirmative action
policies than state policies).
20. Reaffirming the congruence principle in Adarand, Justice O’Connor brushed aside
the glaring exception to that principle offered by the Court’s alienage cases. As she wrote:
“We do not understand a few contrary suggestions appearing in cases in which we found
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Equal protection claims brought by noncitizens are treated differently
depending on whether the discrimination against them occurred at the state
or federal level. State attempts to discriminate on the basis of alienage
generally face far higher hurdles than do those of the federal government.
Importantly, however, the nature of those hurdles has varied across the
Court’s alienage cases. In some instances, state alienage laws have been
preempted outright by the federal government’s occupation of the field in
regard to immigration. In other cases, state laws were subjected to
heightened scrutiny even as federal alienage classifications received only
rational basis review. Finally, no matter what level of scrutiny applied, the
Court has sometimes disregarded certain governmental interests asserted by
states in defense of their alienage laws, branding them improper concerns of
that level of government.
If it is not already clear, I have just described the mirror image of the
three roles federalism has played, or might have played, in striking down
DOMA. Federal preemption of state alienage laws is simply the reverse of
the so-called categorical federalism challenge to DOMA—the claim,
bypassed in Windsor, that Congress lacks the power to define marital
relations, a traditional state concern. Similarly, by ratcheting up the
scrutiny it applied to DOMA, an unusual federal intrusion into state matters,
the Windsor Court flipped the higher scrutiny that state alienage laws face
in comparison to their federal counterparts. Finally, insofar as the Windsor
Court limited what interests the federal government could assert in regard to
DOMA, it again reversed the pattern in the alienage cases, where the
President and Congress have been allowed to assert interests not available
to others. This is all to say that the noncongruent treatment of state and
federal alienage laws—harsher on the states—finds a mirror image in the
tougher treatment seemingly given to federal, as opposed to state,
limitations on marriage in Windsor. Noncongruence works in both
directions.
Given that commentators have so far failed to grapple with Windsor’s
noncongruence, it is hardly surprising that most have also failed to note
Windsor’s deep analogies with the alienage cases, which subvert the
congruence principle in such similar ways. 21 Although these cases have
special deference to the political branches of the Federal Government to be appropriate, e.g.,
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100, 101–102, n.21 (1976) (federal power over
immigration), to detract from this general rule.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 217–18.
21. There is one notable, albeit brief, exception: in an insightful blog post about the
Ninth Circuit’s reading of Windsor in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, a
case about peremptory jury challenges based on jurors’ sexual orientation, Professors
Vikram Amar and Alan Brownstein point to alienage law as an area where, as in Windsor,
there is “a structural dimension to equal protection doctrine.” Vikram David Amar & Alan E.
Brownstein, The Ninth Circuit, in SmithKline v. Abbott Labs, Bars Lawyers from Removing
Gay/Lesbian Jurors, VERDICT: LEGAL ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY FROM JUSTIA (Jan. 31,
2014),
http://verdict.justia.com/2014/01/31/lawyers-allowed-remove-jurors-based-sexualorientation. Discussing the analogy only in passing—but describing the alienage cases, as I
do, as Windsor’s “mirror image”—Amar and Brownstein elide the distinct ways, discussed
in this Article, that structural concerns might impact equal protection analysis. See infra Part
III.
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been reduced within equal protection doctrine to little more than a black
letter punchline, a careful rereading of the alienage cases of the 1970s
unearths a potential model—or better, three potential models—for
understanding how federalism concerns and equal protection scrutiny,
structure and rights, might intersect in Windsor’s wake.
A great deal is at stake in deciding which of these potential models to
follow. As attention has turned from DOMA, a federal statute, to state bans
on same-sex marriage, the question that keeps arising is whether and to
what extent federalism influenced the Windsor decision. The way that
courts understand the interaction of federalism and equal protection in
Windsor could—and I think should—determine the strength of that
opinion’s precedential force over the ever-multiplying same-sex marriage
cases in the states. 22
The return of noncongruent equal protection in Windsor is thus among
the most important, if least understood, doctrinal developments in that case.
But no one has yet asked whether noncongruence, which the Court has so
long and often rejected, should be welcomed back—and, if so, in what
form. The alienage cases help answer both of these questions. In doing so,
they point the way to an equal protection doctrine that incorporates
structural concerns rather than putting them aside or pitting them against
rights discourse.
Parts I and II of this Article explore the various forms that noncongruent
equal protection can take—first in the context of Windsor, then in the
alienage cases. Part III then draws lessons from the alienage context to
better understand which of Windsor’s “federalism noises” 23 are most worth
22. See, e.g., Robicheaux v. Caldwell, No. 13-5090, 2014 WL 4347099 (E.D. La. Sept.
3, 2014); Brenner v. Scott, 298 F.R.D. 689 (N.D. Fla. 2014); Bowling v. Pence, No. 1:14CV-00405-RLY, 2014 WL 4104814 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 19, 2014); Burns v. Hickenlooper, No.
14-CV-01817-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 3634834 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014); Love v. Beshear, 989
F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, No. 1:14-CV-00355-RLY-TAB, 2014
WL 2884868 (S.D. Ind. June 25, 2014), aff’d Nos. 14-2386 to 14-2388, 2014 WL 4359059
(7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d sub
nom. Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2526, 2014 WL 4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014); Whitewood
v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, No. 6:13-CV-01834MC, 2014 WL 2054264 (D. Or. May 19, 2014); Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13-CV-00482-CWD,
2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014); Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL
1418395 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014); DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich.
2014); Tanco v. Haslam, No. 3:13-CV-01159, 2014 WL 997525 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14,
2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-CV8719, 2014 WL 683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456
(E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, No. 14-1167, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th
Cir. July 28, 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky.
Feb. 12, 2014); Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla.
2014), aff’d sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, No. 14-5003, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18,
2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th
Cir. 2014); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Sevcik v.
Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012); Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013). For a list of
currently pending cases, see Marriage Litigation, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
23. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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amplifying. It shows how noncongruent equal protection helps clarify the
marriage challenges that have followed DOMA’s demise and, properly
understood, could also reshape the case law in areas beyond marriage—
alienage included.
I. UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR
Federalism concerns impacted—or might have impacted—the equal
protection analysis in United States v. Windsor in any of three ways, as the
following sections detail. Part I.A describes the most direct way structural
concerns could have played a role: namely, by making equal protection
analysis unnecessary. This is what I refer to below as the “categorical
federalism” 24 approach—a path urged on the Court unsuccessfully in
Windsor. Meanwhile, Parts I.B and I.C describe two ways that equal
protection analysis can be inflected—rather than usurped—by structural
concerns. The first type of federalism-tinged equal protection, described in
Part I.B, varies the level of scrutiny applied to state versus federal laws. In
the second, described in Part I.C, the level of scrutiny is kept constant; what
changes are the governmental interests defendants are allowed to assert
when attempting to survive that scrutiny.
Part I.D, finally, discusses why I refer to these three approaches in terms
of noncongruence. All three have one thing in common: they allow for the
possibility that the same form of discrimination—in this instance,
restrictions on marriage based on sexual orientation—might prove
constitutional in one case and unconstitutional in another, based solely on
the governmental body doing the discriminating. 25

24. Judith Resnik gave the term “categorical federalism” a broader and more pejorative
use in a 2001 essay. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and
the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 620 (2001) (“Categorical federalism’s method first assumes
that a particular rule of law regulates a single aspect of human action. . . . Second,
categorical federalism relies on such identification to locate authority in state or national
governments. . . . Third, categorical federalism has a presumption of exclusive control—to
wit, if it is family law, it belongs only to the states.”). For more recent discussions tied to
DOMA, see, for example, David B. Cruz, The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical
Federalism, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 805 (2011) and Joslin, supra note 12.
25. In tracing how noncongruent equal protection varies between levels of government,
this Article’s discussion is distinct from those that have shown how the Supreme Court
lowers its scrutiny in particular areas of law, often abandoning its professed commitment to
colorblindness. See, e.g., Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 537 (2014) (discussing the Court’s departure from strict scrutiny of race-based
classifications in the domain of family law); see also, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel,
The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination, 58 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 9 (2003) (same for the census); R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and
Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075 (2001) (same
for race-based suspect selection). Adam Winkler has described this as a difference between
“vertical” and “horizontal” tailoring. Winkler, supra note 19, at 184 (“[T]ailoring can
happen vertically with courts treating the federal government differently than state or local
governments. Or it can happen horizontally, with courts treating different governmental
actors at the same level of government (such as educational institutions or prisons) in distinct
ways.” (internal citation omitted)). This Article focuses solely on vertical tailoring.
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A. Categorical Federalism
In the run-up to Windsor, many questioned whether, as Justice Kennedy
asked during oral argument, “the Federal government, under our federalism
scheme, has the authority to regulate marriage.”26 As a group of federalism
scholars argued in their amicus brief filed on Edith Windsor’s behalf (the
“Federalism Scholars’ Brief”): “States derive the power to define marriage
from their police powers, but Congress has no such power. Nor can
Congress justify DOMA under the Commerce, Spending, or Necessary and
Proper Clauses.” 27 The power to define marriage, in other words, is
categorically barred to the national government under our federal system’s
division of power. This “categorical federalism” argument was itself
sufficient to hold Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional, amici argued, since
the question of whether DOMA denied Windsor equal protection of the
laws would not need to be asked if Congress lacked the power to pass
DOMA in the first place.
One of the earlier courts to consider DOMA’s constitutionality had, in
fact, followed the approach spelled out in the Federalism Scholars’ Brief.28
According to the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts,
DOMA violated the Tenth Amendment both because it was an
impermissible use of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause 29 and
because DOMA intruded on “a core area of state sovereignty—the ability to
define the marital status of its citizens.”30
On appeal, the First Circuit rejected the district court’s Tenth
Amendment argument—though it used federalism principles to strike down
DOMA in another way, as the following section discusses. Congress, said
the First Circuit, “surely has an interest in who counts as married,” given
the many federal programs that disperse benefits and determine revenues
based in part on marital status. 31 “That Congress has traditionally looked to
state law to determine” whom to consider married “does not mean that the
Tenth Amendment or Spending Clause require it to do so.”32 According to
the First Circuit, DOMA neither commandeered the states nor directed their
internal operations, even if it may have “put a thumb on the scales and
influence[d] a state’s decision as to how to shape its own marriage

26. Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-307_jnt1.pdf.
27. Federalism Scholars’ Brief, supra note 4, at 12.
28. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.
Mass. 2010).
29. Id. at 248–49 (“[A]s DOMA imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of
federal funding, this court finds that the statute contravenes a well-established restriction on
the exercise of Congress’ spending power.”). The district court drew on a companion case,
Gill v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), in finding that
DOMA’s funding conditions were unconstitutional. For criticism of the circularity of this
approach, see Cruz, supra note 24, at 809–10.
30. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
31. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2012).
32. Id.
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laws” 33—for example, by threatening to rescind federal Medicaid funding
to states, like Massachusetts, which considered the combined income of
same-sex married couples in their state Medicaid programs. 34
The case that the Supreme Court ultimately heard was neither
Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 35 nor Gill
v. Office of Personnel Management, 36 the First Circuit’s cases, but rather
Windsor, which the Second Circuit had decided on equal protection
grounds, applying intermediate scrutiny and finding DOMA wanting.37
Still, the Federalism Scholars’ Brief put an expanded version of the Tenth
Amendment argument that had prevailed in the district court in
Massachusetts solidly before the Supreme Court in Windsor. DOMA’s
sweeping regulation of marital status, the federalism scholars argued, fell
within neither the Commerce nor Spending Clauses, as marital status
(unlike weddings themselves) does not involve interstate commercial
activity and DOMA’s definition of marriage extended to matters (such as
copyright, ethics regulations, and evidentiary rules) not tied to spending. 38
Moreover, DOMA upended the historical “federal dependence on state
marriage law.” 39 By creating, “for the first time, a blanket federal marital
status that exists independent of States’ family-status determinations,”
DOMA—the federalism scholars argued—went far beyond previous limits
on what marriages would be recognized for the purpose of certain defined
federal benefits, such as immigration. 40 DOMA, they argued, interfered
with “some States’ policy judgment that ‘family and society’ would be
strengthened by permitting committed adult couples to marry legally”—a
judgment at the “heart of States’ police powers.” 41
I follow others in referring to claims such as these as “categorical
federalism” arguments. 42 Their common denominator is the argument that
under our federal system, the power to define marriage categorically falls to
the states rather than the federal government. The Supreme Court found it
“unnecessary to decide” the merits of the categorical federalism arguments
raised in Windsor. 43 Suggesting opposition, however, the Court did note
instances in which the federal government has, on the one hand, refused to
33. Id. at 12–13.
34. See id. at 7.
35. 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
36. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
37. For a discussion of the way that federalism concerns impacted the Second Circuit’s
equal protection analysis, see infra Part I.C.
38. Federalism Scholars’ Brief, supra note 4, at 13–14.
39. Id. at 29.
40. Id. at 29–30.
41. Id. at 35.
42. See supra note 24.
43. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (“DOMA rejects the longestablished precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for
all married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to constitutional
guarantees, from one State to the next. Despite these considerations, it is unnecessary to
decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because
it disrupts the federal balance.”).
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recognize valid state marriages and, on the other, recognized common law
marriages not recognized within certain states.44 The federal government,
in other words, has not always abdicated the power to define what counts as
a marriage. 45
According to Professor Courtney Joslin, the Court’s refusal to endorse
categorical federalism in this area is a good thing, at least for supporters of
gay rights. 46 “While its acceptance would have brought along the shortterm gain of providing a basis for invalidating DOMA,” Joslin argues, “it
also would have curtailed the ability of federal officials to protect same-sex
couples and other families.” 47 A categorical federalism decision might
have limited the federal government’s ability to make up for discriminatory
state marriage laws by, for example, counting couples in civil unions or
domestic partnerships as “married” for federal purposes.48 Were marriage
status solely for the states to determine—as the categorical federalism
argument would have it—such “anti-DOMA” provisions would be no more
constitutionally acceptable than DOMA itself.
B. Scrutiny-Enhancing Federalism
Although the First Circuit disagreed with the district court on the issue of
categorical federalism—rejecting the notion that defining marital status is a
prerogative of the states alone—it gave weight to federalism concerns
nonetheless. It used them, in short, to heighten the level of equal protection
scrutiny it applied to the federal law under review. In Judge Boudin’s
words: “Given that DOMA intrudes broadly into an area of traditional state
regulation, a closer examination of the justifications that would prevent
DOMA from violating equal protection (and thus from exceeding federal
authority) is uniquely reinforced by federalism concerns.” 49 According to
the First Circuit, DOMA’s impact on a minority combined with the
federalism concerns it raised together required “somewhat more . . . than
[the] almost automatic deference” that would be given under ordinary
rational basis review. 50
What “somewhat more” might mean, however, was left largely
undefined. The First Circuit insisted that it was not applying intermediate
scrutiny, as that option had been foreclosed in Cook v. Gates, 51 a “Don’t
44. See id. at 2690.
45. See Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2485595 (describing further instances in which
the federal government made family status determinations both to expand and to limit state
status determinations, particularly regarding the status of children).
46. See generally Courtney G. Joslin, The Perils of Family Law Localism, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
47. Joslin, supra note 12, at 158.
48. See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Leveling Up After DOMA, 89 IND. L.J. 43 (2014)
(advocating the creation of a federal domestic partnership registry).
49. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.
2012) (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 15.
51. 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
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Ask Don’t Tell” challenge in which the First Circuit in 2008 had refused to
treat sexual orientation as a suspect classification.52 Instead, the court cited
the rational-basis-with-bite canon 53 for the proposition that rational basis
review should be applied more stringently when discrimination against an
unpopular group might be afoot, compared to when “ordinary economic
legislation” is under review. 54 This is a familiar move within at least
certain pockets of equal protection law, including cases dealing with sexual
orientation. 55 Yet, the First Circuit went further. Prompted by its
federalism concerns, the opinion offered a rational basis review with yet
more bite—though still not (at least officially) intermediate scrutiny. This
rational-basis-with-extra-bite test required “that the federal government
interest in intervention be shown with special clarity” “in areas where state
regulation has traditionally governed.” 56
Professor Joslin has identified a similar move in the Supreme Court’s
Windsor opinion. According to what she calls the “unusualness trigger
argument,” departures from the historic allocation of power between the
states and the federal government lead to a “more careful review under
principles of equal protection.” 57 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
in Windsor, even after disclaiming the categorical federalism approach,
went on to underscore the states’ “historic and essential authority to define
the marital relation” and noted that “DOMA, because of its reach and
extent, departs from this history and tradition of reliance on state law to
define marriage.” 58 Quoting Romer v. Evans, 59 the opinion then declared:
“[D]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful
consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional
provision.” 60

52. Id.
53. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10–11 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
54. Id. at 11.
55. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759–
63 (2011) (discussing the Court’s use of the “rational basis with bite standard” of review).
Professor Katie Eyer has recently shown how in the 1970s, before the middle tier of
intermediate equal protection scrutiny was established for sex and illegitimacy, the Supreme
Court regularly applied a more rigorous form of rational basis review in cases brought by
groups beyond the formally protected classes. Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and
the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2427272 (“[W]here group or rights based concerns are
implicated—including but not limited to the early sex, illegitimacy and sexual orientation
cases—there is a robust history of the Court applying more than de minimis rational basis
review, even outside of the formally heightened tiers.”).
56. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10 (emphasis added).
57. Joslin, supra note 12, at 163.
58. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
59. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
60. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (quoting Louisville
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928))). Louisville Gas makes clear that
“the constitutional provision” at issue is the Equal Protection Clause.
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Joslin aptly argues that the unusualness trigger argument need not be tied
to federalism. 61 In other words, the trigger for closer scrutiny need not be
set off by anything that is unusual from a federalism perspective. 62 What
was unusual in Romer, in fact, was the indiscriminately sweeping nature of
Colorado’s constitutional amendment, which stripped gays and lesbians of
antidiscrimination protections across the state, in all areas of law, and which
prohibited any future protections from being enacted. DOMA, which
amended the federal Dictionary Act 63 rather than any individual law, was
similarly unusual in its sweep. 64
And yet, in Windsor, DOMA’s unusually broad scope was precisely what
made DOMA unusual from a federalist perspective as well. 65 Put another
way, the federal government’s traditionally limited power to define
marriage is what made DOMA so sweeping. Rather than defining what
counts as marriage for a specific purpose like Social Security, DOMA
involved the federal government more broadly—unusually broadly—in an
area of traditional state concern, and thereby—according to the Windsor
Court—triggered a somewhat elevated level of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. 66
Notoriously, the majority opinion in Windsor said even less than the First
Circuit in specifying just what level of scrutiny was warranted.67 As Justice
Scalia complained, the majority opinion “does not apply strict scrutiny, and
its central propositions are taken from rational-basis cases like Moreno.
But the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles that
deferential framework.” 68 Although the majority opinion undoubtedly
discussed both federalism and equal protection concerns, it is not clear that
it employed the doubly heightened rational-basis-with-extra-bite test that
the First Circuit introduced. 69 Indeed, it is hardly clear that the result in
Windsor required anything higher than the scrutiny employed in Romer, a
case which lacked Windsor’s federalism concerns. In both cases, the
governmental interest at stake was said to reduce to a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group.

61. Joslin, supra note 12, at 167.
62. Id.
63. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
64. An example of a different sort comes from Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., where unusual departures from ordinary
legislative or administrative procedures was offered as one factor that might lead to
heightened scrutiny of a facially race-neutral classification or decision. 429 U.S. 252, 267
(1977).
65. “DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of
reliance on state law . . . .” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 2690–92.
67. Cf. id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The opinion does not resolve and indeed does
not even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the
Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for
more than mere rationality.”).
68. Id.
69. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 6 (describing Windsor as “talk[ing] the talk of rational
basis review, even as it applied what might be called rational basis ‘double-plus’”).
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And yet, in Windsor, it was “DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual
tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” that
provided the “strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of
disapproval of that class” of same-sex couples who had entered into statesanctioned marriages. 70 To repeat, then, DOMA’s unusualness within the
federal system is what raised suspicions of animus in Windsor. Take away
its federalism concerns and the Court’s scrutiny of DOMA might not have
been as beady-eyed.
To summarize: concerns about state authority in Windsor affected the
level of equal protection scrutiny given under the Fifth Amendment to
DOMA, a federal law. It follows that a similarly discriminatory state law
would necessarily receive a more lenient form of scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment, for federalism concerns would no longer serve to
ratchet up the scrutiny. If this reading of Windsor is correct, the Court
cannot still say—if it ever truly could—that its “approach to Fifth
Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as
to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 71 The
unusualness trigger argument, insofar as it is triggered specifically by
federalism concerns, makes Windsor’s equal protection necessarily
noncongruent, for the higher scrutiny it triggers will apply only to federal
laws, not their state counterparts.
C. Interest-Constraining Federalism
No matter what level of scrutiny the Court ultimately employed in
Windsor—rational basis with or without either bite or extra bite—
federalism concerns might still have affected the Court’s equal protection
analysis in another way: namely, by limiting the interests that the federal
government could offer to withstand scrutiny. 72
Looking back at Windsor after it was decided, two authors of the
Federalism Scholars’ Brief, Ernest Young and Erin Blondel, argued that
federalism principles “played a critical role in defining the contours of the
equality right at stake, limiting which governmental interests could weigh
against that right.” 73 Whereas DOMA’s defenders had claimed that the
federal government has the same latitude as the states to define marriage, at
least for its own purposes, 74 Young and Blondel contend that the two levels
70. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (majority opinion).
71. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
72. In Roth v. United States, Justice Harlan unsuccessfully urged the Court to take a
similar approach in the First Amendment context. See 354 U.S. 476, 503–05 (1957) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (“[I]n every case where we are called upon to balance the interest in free
expression against other interests, it seems to me important that we should keep in the
forefront the question of whether those other interests are state or federal. Since under our
constitutional scheme the two are not necessarily equivalent, the balancing process must
needs often produce different results.”). For other examples, see Rosen, supra note 16, at
1557–62.
73. Young & Blondel, supra note 13, at 119.
74. See generally Brief for Respondent, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307); see also
Young & Blondel, supra note 13, at 140.
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of government differ significantly in what interests they can legitimately
assert. Young and Blondel argue that the federal government cannot, for
example, claim an interest in preserving the “traditional definition” of
marriage, since that end does not fall within Congress’s enumerated
powers. 75 Equal protection analysis must therefore scrutinize a different set
of interests depending on whether a state or federal law is being analyzed.
The lower courts’ opinions in Windsor offered versions of this argument.
Both the district court, which applied rational basis review, and the Second
Circuit, which applied intermediate scrutiny, canvassed four interests
DOMA might serve: definitional uniformity, fiscal savings, preserving the
traditional understanding of marriage, and encouraging responsible
procreation. 76 DOMA, however, poorly served the second and fourth of
these interests—preserving the fisc and encouraging procreation—because
DOMA’s definition of marriage applied to any number of laws unrelated to
fiscal matters and added no incentives for heterosexual couples to procreate,
responsibly or otherwise. 77 The remaining two interests, however, were
rejected at least in part because they were seen more properly, or
traditionally, as state prerogatives.78
Both courts emphasized that states set internally consistent marriage
policies; the national government traditionally has not. 79 Given the
longstanding variation in state marriage requirements, any attempt by the
federal government to achieve national uniformity would require it to
“sanction[] some of those [states’] decisions and reject[] others.”80 The
consistency interest, in other words, was not only seen as suspiciously
unusual, 81 but it also reduced to Congress’s other asserted interest:
75. Young & Blondel, supra note 13, at 120; see also Federalism Scholars’ Brief, supra
note 4, at 7 (“When this Court considers whether DOMA—under any standard of equalprotection review—serves legitimate government objectives, it can and should consider
whether those ends fall within Congress’s enumerated powers.”).
76. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185–88 (2d Cir. 2012); Windsor v. United
States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 403–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
77. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185–88; Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 403–06.
78. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185–88; Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 403–06.
79. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 186 (“To the extent that there has ever been ‘uniform’ or
‘consistent’ rule in federal law concerning marriage, it is that marriage is ‘a virtually
exclusive province of the States.’” (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)));
Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (“[B]efore DOMA, any uniformity at the federal level with
respect to citizens’ eligibility for marital benefits was merely a byproduct of the states’
shared definition of marriage. The federal government neither sponsored nor promoted that
uniformity.”); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (“DOMA rejects the long-established
precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married
couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from
one State to the next.”).
80. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
81. Here, the unusualness argument, unlike that described above, was not used to trigger
closer scrutiny—the Second Circuit was already applying intermediate scrutiny, after all—
but rather as evidence that Congress’s asserted interest in uniformity on this single issue was
pretextual. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 186 (noting other variations in state marriage laws that
the federal government had left standing); see also David B. Cruz, “Amorphous Federalism”
and the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases, LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 40–
41), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2352038.
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preserving or endorsing the traditional conception of marriage. 82 As to that
interest, the lower Windsor courts were in agreement: since couples get
married under state law, traditional limitations on who can get married can
only be preserved or reformed by the states. 83 Given the ordinary
allocation of power within the federal system, DOMA’s attempt to enact a
substantive moral judgment about marriage was both ineffectual, since the
federal government does not actually marry anyone, and inappropriate—
since such judgments, to the extent they are still allowed after Lawrence v.
Texas, 84 are more properly part of the states’ general police power.85
The upshot of the lower courts’ reasoning in Windsor is that certain
motivations for excluding same-sex couples from the definition of marriage
are simply unavailable to the federal government, even if they might be
available to the states. Unlike the categorical federalism argument, which
purports to keep the federal government out of the marriage definition
business entirely, this “interest-limiting federalism” merely cabins the
interests the federal government may assert (or, under rational basis
scrutiny, the interests a court may hypothesize on the federal government’s
behalf) when justifying whatever definitional limits it has adopted.
A version of the interest-limiting federalism argument survives in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor, though couched in the language of dignity
rather than tradition or morality. Marriage offers what Justice Kennedy
refers to as a “dignity and status of immense import.” 86 But crucially, it is a
dignity that the states confer; indeed, doing so is part of their “historic and
essential authority.” 87 DOMA’s purpose, according to Justice Kennedy,
was “to influence or interfere with state sovereign choices about who may
be married.” 88 Kennedy’s argument, it seems, is that deciding which
couples should be dignified as married is the prerogative of the states, not
the federal government. DOMA thus cannot be defended based on any
asserted federal interest in conferring, or withholding, such dignity. That
interest is unavailable to the federal government, regardless of whether it
remains available for states to assert.
82. See Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (“To accomplish that consistency, DOMA
operates to reexamine the states’ decisions concerning same-sex marriage. It sanctions some
of those decisions and rejects others. But such a sweeping federal review in this arena does
not square with our federalist system of government . . . .”).
83. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 187; Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
84. 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003).
85. Cf. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st
Cir. 2012) (“For generations, moral disapproval has been taken as an adequate basis for
legislation, although usually in choices made by state legislators to whom general police
power is entrusted. But, speaking directly of same-sex preferences, Lawrence ruled that
moral disapproval alone cannot justify legislation discriminating on this basis.” (citation
omitted)).
86. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
87. Id. (“Here the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry
conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import. When the State used its
historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in this way, its role and its
power in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class
in their own community.”).
88. Id. at 2693.
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Much of Windsor’s precedential force turns on this last qualification.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is frustratingly opaque on the question of
whether states might have reasons other than “improper animus” or a
“bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” for choosing to
withhold the dignity of marriage to same-sex couples. 89 Successfully or
not, the majority opinion purports to limit its holding to couples who are
lawfully married under state law.90 The interest-constraining federalism
argument supports that limitation. It suggests that the conferral of dignity
through marriage status might be a permissible interest for states to assert,
even though the federal government could not do so.91
But if that is the case—and if, as Justice Kennedy’s opinion suggested,
DOMA does not serve any other legitimate federal interests 92—then it is
unclear why the majority opinion needed to place so much emphasis on
animus. That is, having disallowed the asserted interest on federalism
grounds, it would seem unnecessary (or redundant) for the Court to reject it
also as illegitimately motivated by animus. The Court’s reliance on U.S.
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 93—where a law failed rational basis
scrutiny because its only purpose was to harm an unpopular group 94—
suggests a broader holding, untethered from any federalism concerns, in
which even states’ refusal to confer the dignity of marriage on same-sex
couples would be seen as an expression of bare animus. According to
Justice Scalia, this is Windsor’s inevitable result. 95
Chief Justice Roberts disagreed. The “logic of [the Court’s] opinion does
not decide,” he claimed, the “question whether the States, in the exercise of
their ‘historic and essential authority to define the marital relation,’ may
continue to utilize the traditional definition of marriage.” 96 He continued:

89. Id.
90. Compare id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), with id. at 2709 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
91. This is decidedly not to say that this interest, when asserted by the states, will prove
important enough, or will be found to have been pursued with sufficiently tailored means, to
survive equal protection scrutiny. In other words, states could very well lose an equal
protection challenge to their same-sex marriage ban even though, in defending those bans,
the states are able to assert governmental interests that were unavailable to the federal
government in Windsor. See infra Part III.
92. The majority opinion suggests this in two ways: first, by claiming that “interference
with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages” was DOMA’s “essence,” Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
at 2693 (majority opinion), and, second, by failing even to mention any of the other asserted
interests DOMA was meant to serve. But see id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
majority . . . affirmatively conceal[s] from the reader the arguments that exist in justification.
It makes only a passing mention of the ‘arguments put forward’ by the Act’s defenders, and
does not even trouble to paraphrase or describe them.”).
93. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
94. Id.
95. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2710 (“[T]hat Court which finds it so horrific that Congress
irrationally and hatefully robbed same-sex couples of the ‘personhood and dignity’ which
state legislatures conferred upon them, will of a certitude be similarly appalled by state
legislatures’ irrational and hateful failure to acknowledge that ‘personhood and dignity’ in
the first place.”).
96. Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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The majority extensively chronicles DOMA’s departure from the normal
allocation of responsibility between State and Federal Governments,
emphasizing that DOMA “rejects the long-established precept that the
incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married
couples within each State.” But there is no such departure when one State
adopts or keeps a definition of marriage that differs from that of its
neighbor, for it is entirely expected that state definitions would “vary,
subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next.” Thus,
while “[t]he State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central
relevance” to the majority’s decision to strike down DOMA here, that
power will come into play on the other side of the board in future cases
about the constitutionality of state marriage definitions. 97

The Chief Justice’s opinion shows how equal protection analysis might
look different when applied to a state limitation on marriage as opposed to
DOMA’s federal limitation. The “normal allocation of responsibility
between State and Federal Governments” 98—that is to say, federalism—
might allow for certain interests to be asserted in state cases but not in
federal cases. The same form of discrimination—limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples—would thus be more likely to survive equal
protection scrutiny at the state level than it proved to be at the federal level.
That is not, of course, to say that a state same-sex marriage ban would
survive equal protection scrutiny. But the list of interests that would have
to be considered in making that decision would, at the very least, be
somewhat longer than it was in Windsor.
D. Noncongruent Equal Protection
Noncongruence results when a court’s equal protection scrutiny is
allowed to differ based on whose law is being scrutinized. Defined at this
level of generality, each of the three approaches described in the previous
three sections might count as a type of noncongruence. Categorical
federalism would have entirely precluded equal protection scrutiny at the
federal (as opposed to state) level. Scrutiny-enhancing federalism, as the
term implies, ratchets up the tier or level of scrutiny applied at the federal
level. Interest-limiting federalism constrains the governmental purposes
that can be asserted to withstand the scrutiny.
This notion of “noncongruence” derives from—and negates—the
congruence principle described by Justice O’Connor in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, where the Court reaffirmed that “[e]qual
protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under
the Fourteenth Amendment.” 99 Congruence requires that discrimination
against a particular group, or on the basis of a particular trait, must receive
the same level of scrutiny no matter “whatever federal, state, or local

97. Id. at 2697 (citations omitted).
98. Id.
99. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
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governmental actor” is doing the discriminating. 100 Under the congruence
principle, for example, classifications based on race, benign or not, now
receive strict scrutiny at all levels of government. Arguing for congruence,
the Adarand Court emphasized how many Fifth Amendment cases had
relied on Fourteenth Amendment precedents, and vice versa.101 Recalling
its words in Bolling v. Sharpe, 102 decided in tandem with Brown v. Board of
Education 103 in May 1954, the Court in Adarand held that “‘it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government’ than it does on a State to afford equal protection of
the laws.” 104
Windsor and, as I discuss next, the Supreme Court’s alienage cases both
show that the “unthinkable” has occasionally been thought when equal
protection analysis collides with federalism concerns.
In fact, in
reaffirming the congruence principle, Adarand itself was rejecting an
especially prominent instance of noncongruence: the Court’s prior
affirmative action case law. Before Adarand, the Court had subjected
benign uses of race at the federal level to a lower tier of scrutiny than that
given affirmative action programs at the state or local levels.105
The following part details some of the arguments that have been made
for and against the congruence principle.106 The point for now is instead to
emphasize what it means for equal protection to be congruent or
noncongruent in the first place. As the discussion of Adarand has already
suggested, the congruence principle, as originally described, specifically
targeted the second, scrutiny-enhancing mode of noncongruence described
above in Part I.B. Adarand overturned precedent that had subjected
affirmative action programs to different levels of scrutiny at different levels
of government. Such variation in the levels or tiers of scrutiny applied is
what the narrowest understanding of the congruence principle prohibits.
The First Circuit’s federalism-enhanced, rational-basis-with-extra-bite equal
protection scrutiny of DOMA clearly violated the principle in this way
because its extra bite applied only to the federal government.
The interest-constraining federalism applied by the lower courts in
Windsor runs afoul of the congruence principle in a subtly different way.
There, the federalism concerns did not affect the level of scrutiny applied.
Instead, they limited the governmental interests that could be asserted in
attempting to withstand such scrutiny. Still, the end result was much the
same: it became possible that a particular classification could survive at the
state level while being struck down on equal protection grounds on the
federal level, since the states but not the national government could assert
100. Id. at 227.
101. Id. at 215–17.
102. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
104. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225 (quoting Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500).
105. Compare Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (intermediate
scrutiny), with Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (strict scrutiny for state
and local governments).
106. See infra Part II.B.
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an interest sufficient to survive the scrutiny applied. Here again, the law’s
constitutionality in regard to equal protection would hinge, or at least could
hinge, on what level of government passed the law. For that reason, I refer
to this too as a form of noncongruent equal protection.
Finally, consider the categorical federalism with which I began. This, it
must be said, is not technically a form of noncongruent equal protection, for
it is not really an instance of equal protection analysis at all. In fact, the
categorical federalism claim in Windsor, had it been successful, would have
allowed the Court to decide the case without ever reaching the equal
protection question. I speak somewhat loosely, then, when I group
categorical federalism and, in the following section, categorical preemption
arguments together with the scrutiny-enhancing and interest-limiting modes
of noncongruent equal protection. The connection is merely that, once
again, an equal protection claim might turn out differently depending on
whether it was brought against state or federal government. In this case,
however, the results would diverge because the equal protection claim
would become superfluous once the federal law was struck down on
federalism grounds—grounds which obviously would not bar a state law on
the same subject.
The three arguments just canvassed are perhaps best described as three
ways of navigating equal protection and the structure of our federalism.
And all three paths have, in fact, been taken—in cases that remain good
law. Although categorical federalism was not employed in Windsor—
unlike the two other modes of noncongruent equal protection, either or both
of which can be found in Justice Kennedy’s opinion—Part II shows that its
mirror image, preemption, has been explicitly invoked as an alternative to
equal protection analysis in the context I turn to next: alienage law.
II. ALIENAGE DISCRIMINATION
State laws that discriminate against noncitizens legally present in the
United States are generally subject to strict scrutiny; federal laws that
discriminate on the same basis receive only rational basis review.107 This
black letter rule admits of one general exception: state limits on who can
“participate in the processes of democratic decisionmaking” need only

107. See, e.g., Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 1005–06 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Although the
Supreme Court has noted the ‘substantial limitations upon the authority of the States in
making classifications based upon alienage,’ the federal government’s interests with respect
to aliens differ substantially from those of the states, and there are legitimate reasons for
Congress to make classifications based on alienage. . . . Accordingly, we review alienage
classifications drawn by Congress under a rational basis test.” (internal citations omitted)
(citing Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982))); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens As Outlaws:
Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42
UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1426 (1995) (“Alienage discrimination by Congress remains subject to
the rational basis test, because of the Court’s asserted incapacity to distinguish federal policy
toward immigrants from federal immigration policy. . . . State discrimination against
permanent resident aliens, in contrast, is usually subject to strict scrutiny, but not when the
discrimination excludes the alien from the exercise of a ‘political function.’”).

174

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

survive rational basis review. 108 Expanded far wider than originally
intended, 109 the exception has been held to apply not just to who can vote
or serve on a jury, but also to who is eligible for government jobs that
involve “discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of policy.”110
Black letter alienage law thus makes clear that when it comes to legally
present noncitizens, equal protection is decidedly noncongruent. Federal
alienage classifications receive far less rigorous equal protection scrutiny
than most of their state law counterparts. As the Supreme Court held in a
1976 alienage case, in sharp contrast to its later statement of the congruence
principle in Adarand, the “concept of equal justice under law is served by
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, as well as by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . [And yet while] both
Amendments require the same type of analysis . . . the two protections are
not always coextensive.” 111
A. Four Cases
Two pairs of cases decided in the 1970s show how noncongruence came
about in the alienage context. Together, they demonstrate how, at least
originally, the differing approaches to state and federal alienage laws were
multiple and complex enough to provide precedent for each of the three
ways that structural concerns and equal protection might have intersected in
Windsor.
1. Graham v. Richardson
Alienage joined the short list of traits that garner strict scrutiny in
Graham v. Richardson, 112 a 1971 case striking down state attempts to limit
welfare benefits only to U.S. citizens and to resident aliens who had
satisfied a residency requirement. 113 According to the Supreme Court in
Graham, “classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality
or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”114 As
to why alienage should receive such scrutiny, the Court explained, without
elaboration, that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and
insular’ minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate.” 115
Even as it struck down Arizona’s and Pennsylvania’s alienage-based
welfare limits on equal protection grounds, however, the Graham Court
went on to adduce an alternate ground for its decision. In the Court’s
108. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978).
109. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 456 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“As originally understood, the Sugarman [political function] exception was exceedingly
narrow.”).
110. Foley, 435 U.S. at 296.
111. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
112. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 372.
115. Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)).
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words: “An additional reason why the state statutes at issue in these cases
do not withstand constitutional scrutiny emerges from the area of federalstate relations.” 116 Congress, the Graham Court held, had provided a
“comprehensive plan for the regulation of immigration and
naturalization”—a plan that took indigence into account—and had thereby
occupied the field.117 “State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for
welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict
with . . . overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to
the Federal Government.” 118 Eight Justices had branded the state alienage
laws unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause; a unanimous
Court found the same laws to have been preempted. 119 Graham’s two
holdings were thus presented as independent routes to the same end: the
invalidation of state welfare restrictions based on alienage. 120
2. Sugarman v. Dougall
Two years after Graham, the Supreme Court again applied strict scrutiny
to a state alienage classification—this time, to New York’s “flat statutory
prohibition against the employment of aliens in the competitive classified
civil service.” 121 In Sugarman v. Dougall 122—a case brought by noncitizen
typists, human resources technicians, and administrative assistants at New
York City’s Human Resources Agency—the Court, citing Graham,
subjected the state’s alienage restriction to “close judicial scrutiny” and
found it wanting. 123 Though states have the power to establish their own
form of government and define their political community, the Court held
that New York’s bar on alien employees was not narrowly tailored to that
goal. 124 “Its imposed ineligibility may apply to the ‘sanitation man, class
B,’ . . . as well as to the person who directly participates in the formulation
and execution of important state policy.” 125
Sugarman’s result was a two-tiered system of equal protection review for
state public employment restrictions based on alienage. As the Court would
later describe it: “We have . . . developed a narrow exception to the rule
that discrimination based on alienage triggers strict scrutiny. This
exception has been labeled the ‘political function’ exception and applies to
laws that exclude aliens from positions intimately related to the process of
116. Id. at 376–77 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 377.
118. Id. at 378.
119. Justice Harlan did not join the Court’s equal protection holding.
120. The independence of the Graham Court’s equal protection holding from its
preemption holding is confirmed by the fact that in Sugarman, discussed below, the Court
was able to reach the same result without reaching the preemption claim that had been
decided in the aliens’ favor in the court below. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646
(1973).
121. Id. at 639.
122. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
123. See generally id.
124. Id. at 636–43.
125. Id. at 643 (citation omitted).
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democratic self-government.” 126 The narrowness of this exception has
become a point of contention, however, in the years since Sugarman.
Police officers, public school teachers, and even deputy probation officers
have all been said to fall within the political function exception,127 while
lawyers and notaries public have not.128
Given the discussion to come, it is important to note that Sugarman’s
“exception” is to the level of scrutiny courts ordinarily give state alienage
laws. Cases that fall within the public function exception are not ones in
which the state’s asserted interest—in having, say, public school children
taught only by U.S. citizens—is found compelling enough to survive strict
scrutiny. Instead, these are cases where strict scrutiny is not even applied.
As Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court in Sugarman, “our scrutiny will
not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within a
State’s constitutional prerogatives.” 129 Justice Blackmun did not, of course,
say that this less demanding scrutiny was merely the rational basis test, but
later Courts did. For governmental positions that “involve[] discretionary
decisionmaking, or execution of policy, which substantially affects
members of the political community,” 130 restrictions based on alienage
have, since Sugarman, received only rational basis review. 131
The Sugarman Court put off for another day the question of whether
citizenship requirements for federal employment were equally
vulnerable. 132 That day came three years later, in Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 133 a Fifth Amendment challenge to the federal Civil Service
Commission’s exclusion of noncitizens from most federal jobs. 134 Were
equal protection analysis congruent in regard to alienage, Sugarman would
have clearly dictated the outcome. But as Mow Sun Wong and another case
decided the same day, Mathews v. Diaz, 135 make clear, equal protection
does not apply congruently to state and federal government in regard to
alienage. Yet as these two cases also show, noncongruence can be achieved
in markedly different ways.
3. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, five Chinese residents of San Francisco
claimed that they had been unconstitutionally denied federal employment
126. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984).
127. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (probation officers); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (police).
128. See Bernal, 467 U.S. at 226–27 (notaries); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(attorneys).
129. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added).
130. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. at 441 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. See Foley, 435 U.S. at 296 (“The State need only justify its classification by a
showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the
limiting classification.”).
132. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 646 n.12.
133. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
134. Id.
135. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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solely because of their citizenship status.136 But for the level of
government involved, Mow Sun Wong practically repeated the facts of
Sugarman. And yet, in Mow Sun Wong, the Supreme Court denied that
equal protection is coextensive under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 137 “Not only does the language of the two Amendments
differ,” Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, “but more importantly, there
may be overriding national interests which justify selective federal
legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State.”138
Considering the constitutionality of the bar on noncitizens in the federal
civil service, the Court determined that “the paramount federal power over
immigration and naturalization forecloses a simple extension of the holding
in Sugarman.” 139
Importantly, however, the noncongruence between Sugarman and Mow
Sun Wong did not result from the application of different levels of scrutiny.
In fact, the Mow Sun Wong Court—to the chagrin of the four dissenters—
failed even to establish what level of equal protection scrutiny should apply,
choosing instead to strike down the alienage classification on procedural
due process grounds. 140 The Court stated that “[w]hen the Federal
Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a
discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if
adopted by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for
presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest.” 141
The problem in Mow Sun Wong was that the regulation at issue—the
employment bar for noncitizens—had come from the Civil Service
Commission, not the President or Congress. 142 Unlike the President and
Congress, who might—the Court assumed without deciding that they
could—have based an alienage restriction on uniquely federal concerns
such as foreign affairs, treaty negotiations, or national immigration and
naturalization policies, 143 the only interest the Court said the Civil Service
136. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 91.
137. Id. at 100. Describing the congruence principle in Adarand, Justice O’Connor
acknowledged this passage from Mow Sun Wong, at least in passing. After canvassing cases
which had treated Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis as equivalent,
she added: “We do not understand a few contrary suggestions appearing in cases in which
we found special deference to the political branches of the Federal Government to be
appropriate, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100, 101–102, n.21 (1976)
(federal power over immigration), to detract from this general rule.” Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995).
138. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added).
139. Id.; see also id. at 101 (“[O]verriding national interests may provide a justification
for a citizenship requirement in the federal service even though an identical requirement may
not be enforced by a State.”).
140. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring) (concurring on the understanding that “there are
reserved the equal protection questions that would be raised by congressional or Presidential
enactment of a bar on employment of aliens by the Federal Government”); id. at 119
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile positing an equal protection problem, the Court does
not rely on an equal protection analysis . . . . The Court instead inexplicably melds together
the concepts of equal protection and procedural and substantive due process.”).
141. Id. at 103 (majority opinion).
142. Id. at 90–91.
143. Id. at 114.
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Commission could legitimately espouse was “the promotion of an efficient
federal service.” 144 And that interest—administrative convenience in
hiring—was found insufficient to justify a wholesale bar on noncitizen
employment. 145
The Mow Sun Wong Court held that to deny aliens “substantial
opportunities for employment” without sufficient reason was to deprive
them of liberty without due process.146 And the Court made clear that what
makes a reason sufficient or not—this is the crucial point for present
purposes—depends in part on the entity asserting the reason.147 According
to the Court, the “overriding national interests” that might have allowed
Congress or the President to discriminate against aliens were not available
to the Civil Service Commission.148 Nor would they be available to state
governments. 149
What I have just described is the mirror image of the interest-limiting
federalism discussed in Part I. When it came to defining marriage, certain
interests were said to be assertable by the states but not by the federal
government. Here, we find interests that the federal government—or more
specifically, the President or Congress—could assert to justify alienage
laws, even though state governments could not do so. Prefiguring the
interest-limiting federalism of Windsor, Mow Sun Wong offers what we
might call interest-limiting preemption.
Two Justices concurred in Mow Sun Wong to emphasize that its
procedural due process holding did not require the Court to decide whether
the uniquely federal interests available to the President or Congress would
have survived an equal protection challenge—a question which would, in
turn, have forced the Court to specify what level of equal protection
scrutiny applied to federal alienage discrimination. 150 Inexplicably,
however, neither justice objected when the Supreme Court, in Mathews v.
Diaz, another alienage case decided the same day, appeared to settle that
very question.
4. Mathews v. Diaz
Mathews v. Diaz, Graham’s federal doppelgänger, asked the Supreme
Court to consider whether Congress could prevent permanent residents
from receiving Medicare benefits until they had lived in the United States
for five years. 151
Because some noncitizens—those who met the residency requirement—
were given Medicare benefits, the Court framed the classification in
144. Id.
145. Id. at 115–16.
146. Id. at 116–17. But see id. at 118 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[N]either an alien nor a
citizen has any protected liberty interests in obtaining federal employment.”).
147. Id. at 119.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
151. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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Mathews as a distinction within the class of aliens, not a distinction between
aliens and citizens. 152 (The Court’s framing of the issue notwithstanding,
aliens and citizens who failed to meet the five-year residency requirement
were of course treated differently under the statute, just as resident aliens
had been under the welfare laws struck down in Graham. 153) The Court
then went on to apply what one commentator called “an astonishingly
lenient version of the rational-basis test.” 154 The residency requirement, the
Court held, was not “wholly irrational” since those who have lived in the
United States longer “may reasonably be presumed to have a greater
affinity with the United States than those who do not.” 155 The Court
neither questioned whether “greater affinity with the United States” was
relevant to the federal government’s interest in providing Medicare benefits,
nor whether increased affinity was even one of Congress’s goals in passing
the residency requirement for aliens.156 Instead, the Court likened the
choice of a five-year residency requirement for aliens to the “task of
drawing lines for federal tax purposes” 157—the sort of congressional linedrawing courts give near-total deference.
Why did the Court subject Congress’s discrimination against aliens in
Medicare to rational basis review, even though it had strictly scrutinized
nearly identical discrimination against aliens in state welfare programs?
Primarily, it seems, because “the responsibility for regulating the
relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been
committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.” 158 Not
wanting to inhibit the political branches from setting immigration policies
that flexibly respond to changing world conditions and affect foreign
affairs, the Court confined itself to “a narrow standard of review of
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration
and naturalization.” 159
152. Id. at 80.
153. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by
the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 290 (observing that a residency
requirement imposed on one racial group but not another could hardly avoid strict scrutiny
despite the fact that the classification could be framed as intraracial).
154. Id. at 284. Otherwise described, the Court applied the form of rational basis scrutiny
traditionally used when reviewing economic regulation, not the more rigorous form of
rational basis scrutiny that was frequently used, particularly in the 1970s, for reviewing
group-based legislation. See generally Eyer, supra note 55.
155. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 83.
156. See Rosberg, supra note 153, at 285.
157. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 83.
158. Id. at 81.
159. Id. at 82. Left undiscussed in Diaz is the question of whether providing medical
insurance to legal residents who happen to be noncitizens actually implicates immigration
and naturalization concerns. The federal political branches’ near-plenary power over who
can enter the country and become a citizen may well be distinguishable from their control
over which of the people allowed to enter are provided Medicare benefits. Cf. Rosberg,
supra note 153, at 328 (“When the government distinguishes between citizens and aliens
with respect to welfare benefits or federal employment, the Court can scrutinize the
legislation without fear of enmeshing itself in the complex process of formulating
immigration policy.”); id. at 334 (“The provision restricting alien participation in the
Medicare insurance program was not in any obvious way concerned with immigration. It
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The Diaz Court noted that Graham’s second ground—its preemption
holding—reinforced the decision to give federal alienage classifications
comparatively lenient scrutiny. 160 Graham’s equal protection analysis,
meanwhile, was said to involve “significantly different considerations
because it concern[ed] the relationship between aliens and the States rather
than between aliens and the Federal Government.” 161 States, the Court
claimed, have no reason to treat legal aliens differently than citizens of
other states when it comes to welfare, since they lack the power to restrict
entry to either. The political branches of the federal government, on the
other hand, are constitutionally empowered to regulate entry and
naturalization.
On their face, these arguments would seem to fit the interest-limiting
preemption found in Mow Sun Wong. Were that the case, the President and
Congress, given what is often described as their near-plenary power to
regulate immigration and naturalization,162 would be able to assert interests
not available to the states—interests that would make it far easier for the
federal government to survive the scrutiny that doomed state alienage laws
in Graham and its successors.
This was not the move made in Diaz, however. Instead of expanding the
interests that the federal government could assert (compared to the states),
the Diaz Court simply lowered the level of scrutiny it applied.163
Prefiguring (and mirroring) the scrutiny-enhancing federalism employed in
the First Circuit’s DOMA opinion, the Supreme Court in Diaz invoked the
federal government’s traditional power over immigration to justify less
rigorous scrutiny of federal alienage laws compared to those of the states.
As a result, laws like the welfare or Medicare restrictions at issue in
Graham and Diaz—laws that discriminate in the same way against the same
minority group—now receive strict scrutiny when passed by states and
rational basis review when passed by Congress. When it comes to alienage,
the noncongruence that the Supreme Court deemed “unthinkable” in
Bolling and Adarand is simply black letter law.
B. Evaluating the Alienage Decisions
The cases just canvassed offer three ways in which the allocation of
power within the federal system has affected equal protection analysis in
did not operate as an express condition on the right of resident aliens to enter the United
States or to make this country their home.”).
160. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 84.
161. Id. at 84–85.
162. But see Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (calling for the Court to “abandon the
special deference it has accorded Congress in the field of immigration”).
163. See Rosberg, supra note 153, at 284 (“[S]ince the federal government has
responsibilities not shared by any state, it may well have interests, compelling or otherwise,
that no state can assert. Thus, the upholding of the federal provision would not necessarily
indicate that the Court had tested it under a standard different from that applicable to the
states. But the Court [in Diaz] left no doubt that it had, in fact, applied a different
standard.”).
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the alienage context. Graham’s alternate holding provides the clearest
reason for treating state and federal alienage laws differently: if the federal
government is seen to occupy the field and state laws are thereby
preempted, equal protection scrutiny becomes unnecessary.
In Graham itself, however, strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause was applied anyway, despite the preemption holding. Read in
connection with its successor, Diaz, which applied rational basis scrutiny,
Graham thus points to another form noncongruence can take: the Court can
simply apply a higher level of scrutiny to state laws than to federal laws.
Finally, Mow Sun Wong suggests a third approach, suggested but not
followed in both Sugarman and Diaz: instead of varying the level of
scrutiny, courts can expand or constrain what interests different
governmental entities are allowed to assert in defense of their alienage
classifications.
Unlike Windsor’s noncongruent equal protection, which, to date, has
gone largely unnoticed by commentators, the alienage cases garnered a fair
amount of scholarly comment around the time they were decided. Partisans
emerged for each of the three approaches just described, and it is worth
excavating their arguments, if only to determine—as Part III will do—
whether they might usefully be reflected in debates over Windsor’s reach.
1. Varying Levels of Scrutiny
The Court’s purest form of noncongruence—giving different levels of
equal protection scrutiny to state versus federal laws—is also its most
controversial. As Gerald Rosberg asked in 1977: “[I]f alienage is a suspect
classification when made the basis of state legislation, should it not remain
suspect when it is used by the federal government?” 164
The response, according to Jesse Choper, is that “Congress has
specifically delegated power in Article I of the Constitution to regulate
immigration and naturalization of aliens.”165 On this argument, it makes
little sense to treat federal alienage distinctions with constitutional
suspicion, given that the Constitution itself gives the federal government the
power to make such distinctions. 166
Gerald Neuman offers two other defenses of the noncongruent levels of
scrutiny applied to alienage laws at the federal versus state level. First, he
argues that these “varying standards of review” are merely pragmatic
164. Id. at 294.
165. Jesse Choper, Discrimination Against Aliens, in JESSE CHOPER ET AL., 4 THE
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981–82, 5, 17 (1983).
166. Professor Rosberg’s article, though written before Choper’s, offers a response: the
federal government should be granted great deference when it sets a “condition precedent”
for an immigrant’s entry to the country; conditions subsequent, however—those conditions
that linger after entry and divide legal residents into unequal castes—should be closely
scrutinized under equal protection principles no matter whether the condition was imposed
by the federal government or the states. See Rosberg, supra note 153, at 331–32; see also
Legomsky, supra note 162, at 256 (distinguishing the Congress’s purportedly plenary power
over immigration law, which deals with the admission and expulsion of aliens, from alienage
law, which deals with the rights and obligations of admitted noncitizens).
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judicial tests, not to be confused with the substance of the constitutional
command of equal protection. 167 In other words, equal protection does not
mean different things when applied to the federal government as opposed to
state governments. Rather, it is the scrutiny courts are willing to employ
that varies depending on the costs of judicial interference in a particular
area or “the limits of judicial competence.” 168
Professor Neuman’s second argument against those who would insist on
congruence is that “the dynamics of the political process may leave a group
more vulnerable at the state level than at the federal level.” 169 This
argument, which dates back to James Madison and the Federalist Papers170
was also made by members of the Supreme Court during the interregnum in
which its scrutiny of affirmative action policies was noncongruent.171
Justice Scalia, for example, argued in his concurrence in City of Richmond
v. Croson 172 that “racial discrimination against any group finds a more
ready expression at the state and local than at the federal level.”173 From
this, Justice Scalia drew the conclusion that even “benign” race-conscious
measures—that is to say, affirmative action—might require closer scrutiny
when employed by states rather than by the federal government. 174
Professor Neuman makes much the same claim about aliens as a suspect
class. Citing in particular California’s sorry history of discrimination
against Chinese immigrants, Neuman argues that the “geographical
distribution of immigrants from various countries has often led to localized
anti-alien movements”; precisely because states lack control over whom to
admit, their residents sometimes “channel their frustration and resentment
about unwelcome federal policies into hostility toward the aliens who are
admitted.” 175 This is said to justify the more stringent scrutiny given to
state alienage laws.
2. Federal Preemption
The unusualness—though not, after Windsor, the uniqueness—of
noncongruent scrutiny applied to alienage laws has caused some to question
whether alienage properly presents a question of equal protection law at all.
Prominent here is Michael Perry, who claims that “[t]he Court’s practice of
167. Neuman, supra note 107, at 1434.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1435.
170. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (warning of the greater dangers of
majoritarian tyranny in smaller political communities).
171. See supra note 16.
172. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
173. Id. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
174. Id. at 522 (“A sound distinction between federal and state (or local) action based on
race rests not only upon the substance of the Civil War Amendments, but upon social reality
and governmental theory.”). The opposite conclusion might just as well have been drawn
from Justice Scalia’s premise: if racial discrimination is more likely to occur on the state
and local level, affirmative action measures meant to counteract such discrimination should
be granted more leeway rather than less in comparison to federal affirmative action
measures.
175. Neuman, supra note 107, at 1436–37.
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disfavoring state laws disadvantaging aliens is best understood and
justified . . . in terms of the supremacy clause principle that no state may
take action that would interfere with—and so is presumptively precluded
by—congressional immigration policy.” 176
Perry prefers preemption to equal protection in explaining the Court’s
alienage case law because he believes that alienage, unlike race, is a
morally relevant basis on which the government can draw distinctions.177
The moral relevancy of a person’s citizenship status excuses what would
otherwise be, for Perry, an impermissible double-standard in the Court’s
alienage cases. Recalling an argument voiced above, Perry contends: “If it
is unjust for a state to treat a person as inferior on the basis of a morally
irrelevant trait, there is no conceivable basis for concluding that it is any
less unjust for the federal government to do the same.” 178 Thus,
noncongruent equal protection, according to Perry, is simply not equal
protection at all. Preemption doctrine rescues what would otherwise be a
serious mistake in the Court’s treatment of noncitizens.
The Supreme Court itself picked up this theme in Toll v. Moreno,179 a
1982 decision striking down, on preemption grounds, Maryland’s denial of
in-state tuition to nonimmigrant aliens. As the Court observed there,
“Commentators have noted . . . that many of the Court’s decisions
concerning alienage classifications . . . are better explained in pre-emption
than in equal protection terms.” 180 The Court cited not just Perry for its
claim but also a 1979 note written by now-Dean David Levi. 181
Levi’s note remains the most complete defense of the preemption
approach to alienage law. Preemption, he claims, provides both “a coherent
explanation for the Court’s past decisions, and a workable framework for
future cases.” 182 Levi’s guiding idea is that the federal government, given
its power over immigration, invites aliens into the country on terms that are
not for the states to alter.183 This, he argues, explains the lower level of
scrutiny given both to state alienage laws under the political function
exception and to federal alienage laws, as compared to ordinary state
classifications.
In regard to the political function exception, Levi claims that “the federal
government has not admitted aliens to the states’ political systems”—or so
courts might find. 184 This would allow courts in political exception cases
(unlike those involving ordinary state alienage laws) to “balance state and

176. Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1063 (1979).
177. Id. at 1061–62.
178. Id. at 1062.
179. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
180. Id. at 11 n.16.
181. See David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal
Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1979).
182. Id. at 1091.
183. Id. at 1070.
184. Id. at 1079.

184

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

federal interests.” 185 Meanwhile, Levi explains the difference between state
and federal scrutiny—Graham versus Diaz—by claiming that it is “within
federal power to exempt itself” from providing aliens and citizens equal
treatment. 186 On Levi’s theory, the requirement that states treat legal aliens
equally to citizens stems solely from the fact that the federal government
What the federal
decided to admit them “without restriction.” 187
government can give under its immigration power, it can presumably also
take away.
Another note, written a year after Levi’s, attempted to offer a more
rigorous test for when state classifications of aliens conflict with the federal
government’s authority over immigration.188 State alienage laws should be
“presumptively preempted,” the author suggested, unless the state
regulation was authorized by Congress or could be analogized to some
federal regulation. 189
Yet, according to Harold Koh, the problem with these preemption
arguments, no matter how they are phrased, is that they “subordinate[]
fourteenth amendment equal protection doctrine governing discrimination
against resident aliens to the vagaries of federal immigration policy.”190
Not only do the preemption theories fail to distinguish “what is
constitutional from what federal policymakers happen to think is wise,”191
but their refusal to constrain the federal government runs counter to other
ways in which federal authority over immigration is subject to
constitutional limits.192
Koh registers another type of complaint against preemption theories as
well: they fail to answer “the moral and philosophical claims that resident
aliens make against their state governments.” 193 Noncitizens, Koh claims,
are rarely heard to complain that the wrong level of government
discriminated against them. 194 Rather, the objection plaintiffs make in the
alienage cases is that they were not judged as individuals. 195 Their pleas

185. Id.; see also id. at 1090 (“[T]he Court appears to reason that there is an area of state
political activity which the states may reserve to citizens without violating the terms of the
federal ‘invitation,’ and which is so central to the states that the Court will not find
preemption, absent a stronger expression of federal intent.”).
186. Id. at 1086.
187. Id.
188. See Note, State Burdens on Resident Aliens: A New Preemption Analysis, 89 YALE
L.J. 940 (1980).
189. Id. at 949.
190. Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal
Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 98 (1985).
191. Id. at 99.
192. See, e.g., Rosberg, supra note 153, at 329–30 (discussing constitutional prohibitions
on convicting a noncitizen without a trial or deporting him or her without providing due
process); see also Legomsky, supra note 162, at 299 (decrying the inconsistency of
protecting immigrants’ due process rights but not substantive constitutional guarantees such
as free speech or equal protection).
193. Koh, supra note 190, at 99.
194. See id. at 100.
195. See id.
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therefore sound in equal protection, not the structural concerns of the
Supremacy Clause. 196
3. Varied Interests
Despite his criticisms of preemption theories, Professor Koh ultimately
argues for an equal protection analysis that takes preemption arguments
more explicitly into account. “A court could blend preemption arguments
into its equal protection analysis to narrow the range of legitimate state
motives that may be invoked to justify an alienage classification,” Koh
suggests. 197 This would, of course, lead to noncongruence: the federal
government would be granted more leeway than the states to discriminate
against aliens without violating equal protection. But this leeway would be
given not because alienage is something other than a suspect classification,
or because federal discrimination against aliens does not offend the
constitutional norm of equal treatment, but because the federal government
has power that states lack to define who aliens are and to invoke unique
overriding national interests in support of alienage classifications.198
Koh’s position here echoes one earlier stated by Gerald Rosberg. 199 The
federal government, Rosberg argued, could justify alienage classification
based on “several interests that a state cannot assert—for example, an
interest in creating a bargaining chip for use in negotiating with other
countries or an interest in preserving an incentive for aliens to seek
naturalization.” 200 Importantly, though, differences in the interests that
could be asserted do not equate to differences in the level of scrutiny those
interests would endure. Rosberg, like Koh, thus argues for the kind of
interest-constraining preemption that was suggested in Mow Sun Wong.
Still, the categorical preemption theorists, Levi in particular, are unlikely
to be convinced. Levi argues that none of the “overriding government
interests” asserted in Mow Sun Wong could have survived strict scrutiny,
even if they had been asserted by the President or Congress rather than the
Civil Service Commission. 201 Had the Court engaged solely in equal
protection analysis and given federal alienage laws the same scrutiny as
state laws, the Court would have either had to (1) strike down the federal
classifications in Mow Sun Wong 202 and Diaz; or (2) credit the federal
interests asserted and thereby water down the strict scrutiny standard—a

196. See id.
197. Id. at 101–02.
198. Id. at 102.
199. See generally Rosberg, supra note 153.
200. Id. at 314.
201. Levi, supra note 181, at 1088. The interests he considers are: (1) creating an
incentive for citizenship; (2) giving a bargaining chip in foreign negotiations; and
(3) assuring the loyalty of governmental employees. Id. at 1087.
202. That is to say, the Court would have had to strike down the Mow Sun Wong
regulation on equal protection grounds, thereby preventing Congress or the President from
reinstating the regulation.
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move “which would have had undesirable effects” on other suspect classes
in need of protection. 203
To this, we might well respond: too bad for the alienage classifications
in Mow Sun Wong and Diaz. That is a response not available to Levi, who
offers preemption at least in part as a descriptive account of why the
Court’s alienage cases came out the way they did.204
As we finally turn back, however, to the question of how best to
understand Windsor and noncongruent equal protection more broadly,
Levi’s constraint drops away. The alienage cases do not just provide a
precedent for Windsor’s seemingly noncongruent equal protection. They
provide several different precedents, and thus several possible ways of
hearing the “federalism noises” in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.
III. THE POSSIBILITIES OF NONCONGRUENCE
The return of noncongruent equal protection in Windsor has largely been
lost on the courts and commentators trying to determine how that case
should be read or followed. Some seem unaware of the very possibility of
noncongruence—or of the line of alienage cases, still in force, that make
noncongruence more than a mere possibility. In its opinion striking down
Wisconsin’s same-sex marriage ban, for example, the federal district court
for the Western District of Wisconsin held that Windsor must apply
squarely to state marriage challenges—just as Justice Scalia had argued in
his dissent—because the court was “not aware of any other case in which
the Court applied equal protection principles differently to state and federal
government.” 205 The discussion in Part II is meant as a corrective to claims
of that sort.
Having assumed congruence, courts and commentators are at a justifiable
loss in trying to explain what role federalism plays in Windsor and should
play in its successors. If, as the congruence principle would have it,
federalism cannot vary the equal protection scrutiny employed at different
levels of government, only two other options remain: either (1) federalism
and equal protection are pitted (or balanced) against each other; or
(2) federalism interests are simply disregarded. Since federalism interests
cannot save a state law from the Equal Protection Clause—that is the point
of the Fourteenth Amendment, after all—both options end up making
structural concerns, and Windsor’s extended discussion of them, entirely
superfluous.
Parts I and II suggest that there is a better way to read Windsor and
understand the relationship between federalism interests and equal
protection. The alienage cases point to the way—or ways. By looking
more closely at the cases that have followed in Windsor’s wake, Part III.A
203. Levi, supra note 181, at 1089.
204. See id.
205. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1017 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (emphasis added)
(“Equal protection analysis [with respect to the federal government] in the Fifth Amendment
area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment [with respect to the states.]”
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976))).
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describes the doctrinal and interpretive confusion caused by their shared
assumption of congruence. The resulting, avoidable confusion provides
further reason to find in Windsor the return of noncongruent, federalismtinged equal protection.
Given that the alienage cases provide more than one model of what
noncongruent equal protection can look like, Part III.B turns to the question
of which of these is the most appealing. Here, Windsor actually helps settle
the dispute that arose over that question in the alienage context—the
dueling views described in Part II.B. To give away the punchline: the
interest-limiting mode of noncongruence should be the winner.
But what would it win? My hope is that it wins greater recognition and
wider acceptance within equal protection doctrine. Part III.C shows what
that would look like, both in the same-sex marriage context and in regard to
alienage. Both areas would look different if they embraced interest-limiting
noncongruence. Part III.C confronts the question of exactly what might
change—which is to say, what is at stake—should the return of
noncongruent equal protection prove lasting.
A. Post-Windsor Decisions
Since Windsor, the cases that have attracted the most attention are the
challenges to same-sex marriage bans being pursued in every state that has
one. 206 But Windsor’s impact has been felt more broadly—particularly in
the Ninth Circuit, where Windsor was used to overturn circuit precedent
and establish sexual orientation as a suspect classification for equal
protection purposes. I look at each of these developments in turn.
1. State Same-Sex Marriage Cases
Kitchen v. Herbert, 207 the first of the post-Windsor decisions to
invalidate a state’s same-sex marriage ban, is representative of what has
come since, both in its result and in its treatment of Windsor’s federalism.
In Kitchen, the federal district court in Utah began its discussion of Windsor
by noting how each side had claimed the case as its own: the state
underscored Windsor’s emphasis on the national government’s long
“reliance on state law to define marriage;” 208 the gay couples who had
brought the suit, meanwhile, argued that just as the Fifth Amendment (in
Windsor) barred the federal government from demeaning their
relationships, so too did the Fourteenth Amendment prevent the states from
doing so. 209
“[T]he protection of states’ rights and individual rights are both weighty
concerns,” the district court acknowledged. 210 Yet, whereas “[i]n Windsor,
these interests were allied against the ability of the federal government to
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra note 22.
961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).
Id. at 1193 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013)).
Id.
Id.
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disregard a state law that protected individual rights,” in a state marriage
case, the Utah court found, federalism and equal protection interests
Citing and describing Loving v.
“directly oppose each other.” 211
Virginia 212 as a case in which the Supreme Court had “balance[ed] the
state’s right to regulate marriage against the individual’s right to equal
protection and due process,” the Kitchen court concluded that “the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that individual rights take precedence over
states’ rights where these two interests are in conflict.” 213
In place of an equal protection analysis which could be infused (and
made noncongruent) by federalism concerns, the Kitchen court saw equal
protection and federalism as two independent interests—ones which might
or might not align. Federalism worries are weighed with the equal
protection concerns in the federal context but against them in a state case,
such as Kitchen. As the Chief Justice wrote in his dissent in Windsor:
states’ rights “come into play on the other side of the board in . . . cases
about the constitutionality of state marriage definitions.”214 Federalism
does not, however, affect the equal protection analysis itself. Equal
protection analysis, it is assumed, remains unchanged in the move from
federal to state law.
It is worth pausing to note how unsatisfying this approach is, however
common it may be. In a constitutional challenge to a state law, balancing
states’ rights and equal protection is necessarily futile, since the former can
never outweigh the latter. (Or as the Kitchen court put it, since “the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that individual rights take precedence over
states’ rights.” 215) States simply cannot violate the Equal Protection
Clause. The only proper question is whether the state has violated the
Equal Protection Clause, not whether it can do so—that is, whether its
interest in doing so somehow outweighs the interests protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
It follows that if equal protection is congruent, federalism concerns will
never prove determinative in cases like Kitchen and Windsor. If a state
violates the Fourteenth Amendment by illicitly classifying on the basis of a
protected trait, no federalism interest can save the classification. Likewise,
if the state classification violates the Fourteenth Amendment, congruence
dictates that parallel federal classifications will violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment as well. But in that case, any
additional federalism concerns about the federal classification—like those
voiced in Windsor—would at best provide an alternate ground for striking
the classification down; federalism would never be a necessary part of the
holding. The result is different when noncongruence is allowed: if equal
211. Id. at 1193–94.
212. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
213. See Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (emphasis added); see also id. (“[T]he
important federalism concerns at issue here are nevertheless insufficient to save a state-law
prohibition that denies the Plaintiffs their rights to due process and equal protection under
the law.”).
214. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
215. Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
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protection analysis can vary (in the various ways described above)
according to the level of government involved, it is always at least
theoretically possible that the resulting variance in the level of scrutiny, or
the assertable interests, could lead to a different outcome.
Having seen the Kitchen court’s approach and its shortcomings, other
recent state same-sex marriage opinions can be summarized more quickly.
Several have ignored Windsor’s discussion of federalism entirely.216
Others, like that of the Eastern District of Virginia in Bostic v. Rainey,217
have taken pains to emphasize that “federal intervention is best exercised
rarely” in domestic relations cases and even that Windsor upheld “state law
against conflicting federal law.” 218 Putting aside any inaccuracies in the
latter claim, what is striking about Bostic is the fact that its talk of
federalism does no work whatsoever. Having just underscored Windsor’s
federalism, the next sentence in the opinion reads: “The propriety of
invoking such protection [e.g., due process and equal protection] remains
compelling when faced with the task of evaluating the constitutionality of
state laws.” 219 Like Kitchen before it, Bostic cites and quotes Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Windsor as support for its claim that Windsor’s equal
protection analysis inevitably applies no less to the states than to the federal
government. 220
There is one important exception to this trend. In Bishop v. United States
ex rel. Holder, 221 Oklahoma’s same-sex marriage case, the district court
drew the following principle from Windsor: “[A] state law defining
marriage is not an ‘unusual deviation’ from the state/federal balance, such
that its mere existence provides ‘strong evidence’ of improper purpose. A
state definition must be approached differently, and with more caution, than
the Supreme Court approached DOMA.” 222 I take this to mean that the
unusualness trigger discussed in Part I.B—in which DOMA’s attempt to
216. See, e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at *4 n.11
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) (describing the state claim brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment as “subject to the same substantive analysis” as the Fifth Amendment claim in
Windsor); Gray v. Orr, No. 13 C 8449, 2013 WL 6355918, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2013)
(discussing Windsor without mentioning federalism); Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501,
2013 WL 3814262, at *1, *3 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) (describing Windsor’s holding as
merely “ostensibly limited” to federal interference with state marriage laws and equating
Windsor’s equal protection analysis with that of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), a
Fourteenth Amendment case).
217. 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014).
218. Id. at 476.
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)); Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (“The court agrees with Justice Scalia’s
interpretation of Windsor and finds that the important federalism concerns at issue here are
nevertheless insufficient to save a state-law prohibition that denies the Plaintiffs their rights
to due process and equal protection under the law.”), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
See generally Jesse Wegman, Scalia Has Seen the Future, and Its Name Is Marriage
Equality, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2014), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/14/
scalia-has-seen-the-future-and-its-name-is-marriage-equality/ (describing several federal
judges as “hav[ing] a little fun with Justice Scalia’s dire warnings” in Windsor).
221. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014).
222. Id. at 1279 (emphasis added).
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define marriage was found unusual within the federal system—is lacking in
state cases, and state classifications should thus be given a somewhat lower
level of scrutiny than the Supreme Court gave DOMA. On this reading,
Bishop is the rare case that has flirted with noncongruent equal protection—
specifically, scrutiny-altering noncongruence, the kind described in Parts
I.B and II.B.1. Since it found that state definitions of marriage were to be
given more leeway than federal laws like DOMA, the Bishop court could
follow Tenth Circuit precedent and apply rational basis scrutiny 223 even if
the Supreme Court, in Windsor, had employed a more rigorous level of
review.
The Tenth Circuit has now reviewed both Bishop and Kitchen, the Utah
case, and affirmed their results—though on substantive due process grounds
rather than equal protection. 224 The Fourth Circuit took the same approach
in Bostic, affirming same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry.225
Importantly, both courts did so only after denying that federalism interests
had played a meaningful role in Windsor. 226 (The Seventh Circuit, by
contrast, ignored the federalism component of Windsor entirely. 227)
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit expressed concern that
[i]n Windsor, the Court did not label the type of constitutional scrutiny it
applied, leaving us unsure how the Court would fit its federalism
discussion within a traditional heightened scrutiny or rational basis
analysis. The lower courts have taken differing approaches, with some
discussing Windsor and federalism as a threshold matter and
others . . . considering federalism as a state interest underlying the samesex marriage bans at issue. 228

As I have already indicated, neither of these alternatives makes sense.
To treat federalism as a “threshold matter” is to take the categorical
federalism approach. But since Windsor specifically disclaimed that path,
lower courts are right to do so as well. The result, however, is that those
courts have to set aside federalism interests entirely, since they lack another
way of incorporating them into their analysis. The second alternative,
considering federalism itself as a state interest within equal protection
scrutiny, is similarly unavailing since states’ rights can never rescue a law
that would otherwise violate equal protection. Both of the Fourth Circuit’s
alternatives thus reduce Windsor’s talk of federalism to mere surplusage.

223. Id. at 1287 (citing Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2008)).
224. Bishop v. Smith, No. 14-5003, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014); Kitchen,
755 F.3d at 1193.
225. Bostic v. Schaefer, No. 14-1167, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014).
226. Id. at *11 (“[T]he Court did not lament that section 3 [of DOMA] had usurped
states’ authority over marriage due to its desire to safeguard federalism. Its concern sprung
from section 3’s creation of two classes of married couples within states that had legalized
same-sex marriage.” (citation omitted)); Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1207 (“Rather than relying on
federalism principles, the Court framed the question presented as whether the ‘injury and
indignity’ caused by DOMA ‘is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by
the Fifth Amendment.’”).
227. See Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2526, 2014 WL 4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).
228. Bostic, 2014 WL 3702493, at *11 n.8.
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2. Windsor’s Other Progeny
State marriage cases such as these are not the only ones to grapple with
Windsor’s import. In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,229
for example, the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether peremptory
strikes during jury selection could be based on sexual orientation.230 In
answering that question, the panel relied on Windsor to overturn prior Ninth
Circuit precedent and hold that classifications based on sexual orientation
receive heightened scrutiny. 231 What mattered to the SmithKline court was
not what Windsor said, but what it did.
By way of background: the Supreme Court has held that peremptory
challenges during jury selection cannot be based on traits, like race or
gender, that trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause. 232 The Ninth Circuit had previously determined, however, that
classifications based on sexual orientation should receive only rational basis
review. 233 In SmithKline, sexual orientation could therefore join race and
gender as a proscribed basis for peremptory challenges only if the Ninth
Circuit raised the level of scrutiny it had previously given sexual
orientation. Windsor, the court held, required it to do exactly that.
Recognizing that the majority opinion in Windsor studiously avoided
mentioning tiers of scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit instead emphasized three
things it did do: (1) it focused on Congress’s actual reasons for passing
DOMA rather than hypothesizing possible aims; (2) the Windsor majority
talked of “legitimate” state interests that “justify” the law’s treatment of
same-sex couples; and (3) Windsor’s equal protection analysis relied in part
on other heightened scrutiny cases. 234 These three moves, according to the
SmithKline court, together showed that “Windsor scrutiny ‘requires
For
something more than traditional rational basis review.’” 235
classifications based on sexual orientation, “Windsor requires heightened
scrutiny.” 236
In an analysis written soon after SmithKline was decided, Professors
Vikram Amar and Alan Brownstein rightly observed that “[t]here is
virtually no mention in SmithKline of the federalism argument that makes
up so much of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor.” 237 Uncertainty
about how federalism and equal protection interact in Windsor might have
led the Ninth Circuit to ignore federalism entirely, they argued—just as I
have argued in regard to so many of the recent state same-sex marriage
229. 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
230. See id.
231. See id. at 481.
232. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (race); cf. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143 (allowing peremptory
challenges against members of groups that receive only rational basis review).
233. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990).
234. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 480–81.
235. Id. at 483 (citing Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2008)).
236. Id.
237. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 21.
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decisions. Noting Windsor’s parallel with the alienage cases (as no other
commentators have done), Amar and Brownstein argued that because the
federal government has the power to regulate immigration and
naturalization, “state laws discriminating against non-citizens are more
problematic and suspicious than discriminatory federal legislation;”
similarly, “[b]ecause marriage is quintessentially a matter of state
sovereignty and control, it is federal laws discriminating against couples a
state deems to be married that seem suspicious and problematic and warrant
at least rational basis with teeth review.”238
In the confines of their online essay, Amar and Brownstein did not
discuss the fact that the equal protection analysis they described in Windsor,
like that of the alienage cases, violates the congruence principle. Nor were
they able to consider the ways—described in Parts I and II of this Article—
that federalism concerns might impact equal protection analysis other than
by varying its level of scrutiny. This becomes especially important in light
of their provocative conclusion: that by neglecting the role that federalism
played in Windsor, the Ninth Circuit in SmithKline might have missed the
fact that the heightened scrutiny in Windsor, such as it was, was tied to
DOMA’s unusual federal intrusion into marriage law, not to sexual
orientation classifications in general. In Amar and Brownstein’s words, “it
is hard[] to read Windsor as holding that all laws discriminating against
gays and lesbians should receive heightened scrutiny, where there is no
structural basis for distinguishing between the exercise of federal or state
sovereignty in the government’s actions.” 239
What is provocative here is the idea that Windsor might have accorded
heightened equal protection scrutiny not to sexual orientation
discrimination per se, but solely to sexual orientation discrimination in the
sphere of marriage. The claim, in other words, is that the level of scrutiny
might vary not just between federal and state laws—thereby violating the
congruence principle—but also among the many domains in which
discrimination can occur. Laws discriminating against same-sex couples in
regard to marriage might trigger a different tier of scrutiny at the federal
compared to state level and in comparison to other areas of law, such as
jury selection.
As the following section will show, making the level of equal protection
scrutiny domain-specific in this way is a move that courts have made
before. But it is a bad idea, and one that upends a good deal of established
equal protection doctrine. Fortunately, it is a bad idea that the interestconstraining version of noncongruent equal protection is able to avoid—a
fact that, as I will argue, weighs in the latter’s favor.
B. Which Form of Noncongruence Is Best?
Parts I and II describe how noncongruence in Windsor might be
understood as taking either of two forms, both of which hearken back to the
238. Id. (emphasis added).
239. Id.
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alienage discrimination cases of the 1970s.
Structural concerns—
federalism in Windsor, preemption in the alienage cases—could lead courts
to apply different levels of scrutiny to state versus federal laws.
Alternatively, the respective roles of state and national government might
limit the interests each could assert when one of its laws is subjected to
equal protection scrutiny. On this latter approach, the tier of scrutiny would
remain constant; what would vary are the aims that courts might
hypothesize (if rational basis is being used) or (if heightened scrutiny is
employed) that the government could offer to justify its use of a protected
trait.
Parts I and II also identified yet another approach: categorical federalism
or preemption. Academic criticism, however, has questioned both the
accuracy and the desirability of claims that the states do or should have the
exclusive power to define marriage, 240 or that the federal government has
sole control over immigration and alienage regulations. 241 In any case, the
Supreme Court explicitly disclaimed reliance on categorical federalism
arguments in Windsor. And, as already noted, categorical federalism (or
preemption) supplants equal protection analysis rather than making it
noncongruent. For that reason, categorical claims are set aside in what
follows, where the question is how the infusion of structural concerns into
equal protection might best be understood.
The scrutiny-varying mode of noncongruence—the mode that was
employed by the First Circuit when it struck down DOMA, suggested by
Justice Kennedy in Windsor, hinted at by the district court that struck down
Oklahoma’s same-sex marriage ban, and, finally, that remains fundamental
to black letter alienage law—is vulnerable, at least on its face, to what
might seem like a decisive objection: that the morality of discrimination
does not vary among levels of government. 242 A person’s race, for
example, becomes no more relevant to that person’s worth or ability to
contribute to society at the state level than at the federal level (or vice
versa). What’s more, a person whose government treats her unequally on
the basis of her race surely does not care primarily about which level of
government has done so.
As the tiers of scrutiny are ordinarily employed, a class or classification
is deemed suspect, then laws targeting that class, or making that
classification, are subjected to heightened review. Here again it seems
strange to think that federalism concerns should affect whether a group is
considered a suspect class, allowing for different answers at different levels
of government. If heightened scrutiny is meant to “smoke out” the
prejudice or stereotyping to which certain groups are thought to be

240. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 45, Joslin, supra note 46; Joslin, supra note 12; Resnik,
supra note 24.
241. See, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703
(2013); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A
Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074 (2013).
242. See Perry, supra note 176, at 1062.
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unusually susceptible, 243 it would seem that such prejudice could be found
anywhere, at any level of government.
The factors currently used to determine whether heightened scrutiny of a
group or trait is warranted offer the makings of a counterargument,
however. Courts traditionally ask whether those sharing the trait have
historically been subjected to discrimination; whether the trait typically
bears a relation to one’s ability to contribute to society; whether the trait is
immutable and distinguishing; and whether those sharing the trait are
politically powerless. 244 The second and third of these factors—relation to
ability and immutability—can hardly vary by level of government. But
historical discrimination and political powerlessness could do so: recall
Professor Neuman’s assertion that anti-immigrant sentiment has historically
run higher in the states, 245 or Justice Scalia’s Madisonian belief that racial
discrimination is, as a matter of “social reality and governmental theory,”
likely to be worse the smaller the community. 246
Equal protection doctrine has not traditionally considered past
discrimination and political powerlessness in such a fine-grained way. But
it could. 247 In determining suspectness, courts could consider, within each
jurisdiction, the amount of discrimination a group has experienced and the
level of political power the group has attained there. This, of course, would
lead to the possibility that the list of suspect classes might vary not only
between levels of government, but also from state to state, or even city to
city. 248 Were there a particularly enlightened state in which, say, women
had always been powerful and well-treated, women would not comprise a
protected class there, and laws in that state that classified on the basis of
gender would receive only rational basis scrutiny.
As I said, courts have not traditionally proceeded this way. Moreover,
the two factors that would allow for such variation among jurisdictions are
243. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of strict
scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race . . . .”); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The First
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 785–86 (2001). Some have questioned
whether strict scrutiny is still “intended to ‘smoke out’ invidious uses of race” now that a
majority on the Court purports to treat all racial classifications as invidious. See Eyer, supra
note 25, at 573. Even so, as discussed below, those who judge racial classifications to be
inherently invidious are especially unlikely to vary that judgment based on the level of
government doing the classifying.
244. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012).
245. See Neuman, supra note 107.
246. Croson, 488 U.S. at 522–23 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
247. For a recent attempt to do this empirically in the voting rights context, see
Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial Stereotyping:
Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After Shelby County, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2262954.
248. The Court gestured in this direction in a 1954 equal protection case, Hernandez v.
Texas, challenging the systematic exclusion of Mexican-Americans from juries in Jackson
County, Texas. See 347 U.S. 475 (1954). Addressing the question of whether “persons of
Mexican descent” formed a protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held
that “community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from the
community norm may define other groups which need . . . protection. Whether such a group
exists within a community is a question of fact”—one the Court went on to answer
specifically in regard to Jackson County. Id. at 479–80.
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notable, not least, for being the factors that speak to the suspectness of a
class, as opposed to a classification. 249 Past discrimination and political
powerlessness are tests that identify particular groups—such as AfricanAmericans, women, or gays and lesbians—as likely targets of animus. The
relevance to ability and immutability tests, by contrast, pick out traits such
as race, gender, or sexual orientation. For better or (no doubt) worse, the
Supreme Court has lately cared far more about suspect traits than groups. 250
Anti-classificationist rather than anti-subordinationist—outside the context
of sexuality, at least—the current Court’s equal protection case law aims to
keep the government from using suspect traits such as race in any context;
recent cases show no special concern for protecting historically vulnerable
groups of people. 251 White plaintiffs thus receive a higher level of scrutiny
when challenging the use of race in affirmative action programs than female
plaintiffs do when alleging gender discrimination. The current Court,
therefore, is especially unlikely to rely on the history of discrimination and
political powerlessness tests to vary equal protection scrutiny among levels
of government, or from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. If, as the anticlassificationists on the current Court believe, our Constitution is
colorblind, then it surely follows that race is not to be seen by any
governmental actor. Considerations like these suggest how hard it would
be for courts to openly embrace an equal protection doctrine that allowed
for scrutiny-varying noncongruence.
Moreover, in the context of Windsor, there is a more specific reason for
looking beyond the scrutiny-varying mode of noncongruence. This stems
from the problem with which the last section ended. As I noted there,
Windsor’s federalism provides little basis for applying heightened scrutiny
to gays and lesbians as a group. The unusualness trigger 252 used to
heighten the scrutiny in Windsor is specific to one particular domain—
marriage, or family status determinations more broadly—not to the law’s
general treatment of sexual minorities. As Professors Amar and Brownstein
suggested in their discussion of SmithKline, the federalism concerns raised
in Windsor fail to provide a similar basis for treating all laws that impact
gays and lesbians with increased suspicion. 253
Admittedly, Windsor would not be the first—or last—same-sex marriage
case to toy with the idea that gays and lesbians should be considered a
249. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 563 (1998) (“The
tension between the class-based view and the classification-based view manifests itself in the
standard heightened scrutiny test.”).
250. Id. (“The Supreme Court has resolved this tension in favor of the classificationbased approach.”).
251. See Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has used its intent and colorblindness doctrines to ignore the
persistence of racial discrimination against non-whites); Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court
2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013) (describing a
bifurcated case law that, at least in the context of race, treats equal protection claims brought
by majority groups more favorably than those brought by minorities).
252. See supra Part I.B.
253. See supra note 21; supra Part III.A.2.
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suspect class in some spheres but not others. Consider, for example,
Hernandez v. Robles, 254 the unsuccessful 2006 challenge to New York’s
same-sex marriage ban. The New York Court of Appeals observed that a
law should receive rational basis scrutiny whenever the group challenging
the law is linked by some characteristic that is relevant to the law’s aim.255
When the group’s shared trait is irrelevant to the law’s purposes, heightened
scrutiny is needed. 256 The Court of Appeals then continued:
Perhaps that principle would lead us to apply heightened scrutiny to
sexual preference discrimination in some cases, but not where we review
legislation governing marriage and family relationships. A person’s
preference for the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the birth of
children is relevant to the State’s interest in fostering relationships that
will serve children best. In this area, therefore, we conclude that rational
basis scrutiny is appropriate. 257

The Second Circuit rightly rejected an equivalent argument in Windsor,
holding that the procreative ability of same-sex couples was relevant not to
the level of scrutiny applied but to whether marriage restrictions could
withstand such scrutiny. 258 Surely this is correct: the Supreme Court’s
equal protection cases, including the one the New York Court of Appeals
cited in Hernandez, 259 establish the proper tier of scrutiny by asking
whether a group’s shared trait “generally” or “frequently bears [a] relation
to ability to perform or contribute to society.” 260 The level of scrutiny, in
other words, is established by the trait’s general relevance to the law.
Whether that trait is relevant to any particular law—whether sexual
orientation is relevant to marriage, for example—is what courts determine
when they go on to apply the chosen level of scrutiny. The higher the
scrutiny, the more relevant the trait will need to be to the law’s aims. The
Hernandez v. Robles approach to equal protection, in short, simply
misunderstands the way that tiers of scrutiny are established and applied.
A post-Windsor example of this misunderstanding can be offered as well.
Dicta 261 in the recent Wisconsin marriage case offered intermediate
254. 7 N.Y.3d 338 (2006).
255. Id. at 364.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 364–65 (emphasis added).
258. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 183 (2d Cir. 2012).
259. Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 364 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985)).
260. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–41 (emphasis added) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
261. I refer to this as dicta because, like many other marriage opinions have done—see,
for example, Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2526, 2014 WL 4359059, at *3 (7th Cir. Sept. 4,
2014) (“The discrimination against same-sex couples is irrational, and therefore
unconstitutional even if the discrimination is not subjected to heightened scrutiny.”); De
Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 652–53 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 482 n.16 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“Although this Court need not decide whether
Virginia’s Marriage Laws warrant heightened scrutiny, it would be inclined to so find.”);
Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management, 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310–34 (D. Conn. 2012)
(pre-Windsor DOMA decision that exhaustively discussed the “traditional indicia of
suspectness,” found that heightened scrutiny should apply to classifications based on sexual
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scrutiny as the proper tier for examining sexuality-based discrimination. 262
In reaching that conclusion, however, the district court had to distinguish
somewhat dated Seventh Circuit precedent that subjected sexual orientation
discrimination to only rational basis review.263 The district court argued
that rational basis review only applies to sexual orientation discrimination
in military contexts. 264 Here again, courts seem to have lost sight of the
reason certain group classifications are treated with suspicion and why the
resulting level of scrutiny should apply across the board. 265 If gays and
lesbians are deserving of special judicial solicitude, that is for reasons that
surely apply in military contexts no less than in civilian life. Gays and
lesbians undoubtedly have no more political power, no less ability to
contribute, are united by no less an immutable trait, and have experienced
no less a history of discrimination in the military than elsewhere. It makes
little sense, then, for their status as a suspect class to vary by context.266
The level of scrutiny required hardly lessens in the military context; what
changes is the importance of the governmental interests involved. 267
This, finally, points to a way around the reading of Windsor given in the
previous section, under which sexual orientation would receive heightened
scrutiny at the federal level only in the realm of marriage. The solution
comes from the interest-limiting mode of noncongruent equal protection.
Unlike scrutiny-varying noncongruence, the interest-limiting mode allows
courts to pick a tier of scrutiny for a given group or trait and stick with it,
both across areas of law and between levels of government. Yet federalism
still has a role to play in the equal protection analysis. Rather than altering
the level of scrutiny applied, federalism concerns would constrain what
governmental interests the federal government, compared to the states, is
able to assert when its regulation of a particular domain is under scrutiny.

orientation, but then held that DOMA failed rational basis review)—the district court in the
Wisconsin case considered at length why heightened scrutiny should apply, only then to
decide that rational basis with bite was all that was needed to strike down the state’s ban. See
Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1009–17 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
262. See Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1009–17.
263. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989).
264. In this, the district court followed a Seventh Circuit opinion post-dating Ben-Shalom
v. Marsh. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In this case we need
not consider whether homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class, which would subject
the defendants’ conduct to either strict or heightened scrutiny. Our court has already ruled
that, in the context of the military, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is subject
to rational basis review.” (emphasis added)).
265. They also lose sight of precedent such as Rostker v. Goldberg—a case challenging
gender inequity in the draft—where the Court recognized the deference owed the political
branches in military affairs, but refused to abandon or “further refine” the intermediate
scrutiny test for gender-based discrimination established in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976). See Rostker, 453 U.S. 57, 69 (1981).
266. But see supra note 25, describing contexts—such as family law, governmental
record keeping, and criminal suspect selection—in which the Supreme Court seems to have
varied the level of scrutiny it gives classifications based on race.
267. A parallel argument can be made in the context of prisons, where the Supreme Court
has rejected the invitation to lower its scrutiny of race-based classifications. See Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
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Varying equal protection scrutiny across levels of government and
domains of law untethers the tiers of scrutiny from the factors by which
those tiers are meant to be selected. Instead of focusing on a trait’s
relevance or immutability, or a group’s powerlessness and history of
discrimination, tier selection instead gets relativized jurisdiction by
jurisdiction and topic by topic. Were this path followed, the tiers would
soon multiply beyond any possible usefulness. 268 The fact that the interestlimiting mode of noncongruent equal protection avoids this messy result is
yet another—I think decisive—reason, in addition to those offered in the
alienage discussion of Part II, to prefer it over its scrutiny-varying
counterpart.
What remains to be seen is how interest-limiting
noncongruence would reshape the areas of case law that this Article
describes.
C. Interest-Limiting Noncongruence
Interest-limiting noncongruence boasts two virtues. First, it incorporates
structural concerns into equal protection analysis, allowing for the
possibility that parallel federal and state classifications need not always
stand or fall together. Second, it does so without requiring that
discrimination against a particular group receive shifting degrees of scrutiny
based solely on which level of government does the discriminating. In
short, interest-limiting noncongruence respects federalism as well as the
intuitive notion that equal protection scrutiny should mean the same thing at
all levels of government.
I have drawn the notion of interest-limiting noncongruence—the idea that
interests assertable for equal protection purposes might vary at different
levels of government—from both the alienage case law, especially Mow
Sun Wong, 269 and from Windsor. 270 But in doing so, I hardly mean to
suggest that interest-limiting noncongruence is commonly found in either
the alienage cases or in Windsor’s line of successors. It is not. As a result,
my take on those two lines of cases is necessarily going to be a revisionary
one. The question thus becomes: What would need to change—and what
is at stake in doing so? I look first at alienage, then at the marriage cases.

268. In saying this, I am only adding to the powerful criticisms that have been made
against the tiers’ usefulness in general. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications,
17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241335;
Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case
for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339 (2006). A more
flexible version of the tiers that incorporated interest-limiting noncongruence might respond
to some of the criticisms that have been offered, though detailing this is beyond the scope of
the present piece.
269. See supra Part II.A.3.
270. See supra Part I.C.
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1. Effects on Alienage
Although Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong offered what can be understood as
an interest-limiting rationale—striking down a federal alienage restriction
because it served an interest that was not the Civil Service Commission’s to
assert—the more common approach in the alienage cases has been to vary
the level of scrutiny between federal and state governments, and between
state discrimination that does or does not pertain to political functions.
Federal alienage laws thereby get rational basis review, ordinary state
alienage laws get strict scrutiny, and state alienage laws pertaining to
political functions are reviewed for rational basis.
These distinctions are, of course, products of their history. When
Graham was decided, establishing noncitizens as a suspect class in 1971,
intermediate scrutiny did not yet exist. Even most of the early rational basis
with bite cases were still to come. 271 By the time the Court considered
Graham’s federal analogue, Mathews v. Diaz, in 1976, the Justices were
simultaneously debating how to scrutinize age discrimination, and new
cases based on gender and illegitimacy had been accepted for the following
Term. 272 In the midst of this onslaught, the Court, in Diaz, retreated to
rational basis review for federal alienage classifications, purportedly out of
fear that strict scrutiny would overly inhibit the federal government’s
flexibility in managing immigration. 273 Classifications based on citizenship
are the very substance of immigration law, which the Constitution entrusts
to Congress. It makes little sense, then, to treat such classifications with the
suspicion that strict scrutiny demands—or so the Court concluded.274
The problem in Diaz is that the alienage-based Medicare restrictions at
issue in that case were not, in any obvious way, part of immigration law at
all. To borrow a distinction drawn by Gerald Rosberg, the Medicare
regulations were not “conditions precedent” for an alien’s entry; they were
conditions subsequent to entry, used to divide legal residents of this country
into unequal castes. 275 In trying to give the political branches of the federal
government nearly free rein to decide which noncitizens can enter the
United States, 276 the Supreme Court reined in its own ability to review the
federal government’s discriminatory treatment of noncitizens who had
271. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimacy);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender). See generally Eyer, supra note 55 (describing
this history).
272. Eyer, supra note 55, at 24; Earl M. Maltz, The Burger Court and the Conflict over
the Rational Basis Test: The Untold Story of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
J. SUP. CT. HIST. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2357616.
273. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80–82 (1976) (“Any rule of constitutional law
that would inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to
changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution.”).
274. Id. at 81–82 (“The reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also
dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the
area of immigration and naturalization.”).
275. See Rosberg, supra note 153, at 331–32 & n.215.
276. But see Legomsky, supra note 162 (criticizing the Court’s excessive deference to the
political branches even in matters properly categorized as immigration, rather than alienage,
law).

200

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

already been allowed to enter. The Court let the importance of certain
federal governmental interests drive the choice about what level of scrutiny
to provide, rather than choosing a level of scrutiny based on the usual
factors (history of discrimination, relevance to ability, immutability, and
political powerlessness) and then asking whether the asserted interests were
important enough to survive such scrutiny. This is an important general
point: by failing to allow different governmental actors to assert different
interests, the Court may be pushed to extremes in selecting which tier of
scrutiny to apply, for it needs to rely on the tier to more-or-less determine
the outcome.
Without that need, the Court might well have decided—or could decide
now—that alienage deserves intermediate scrutiny, since noncitizens have
long been the target of animus and lack the right to vote—factors that point
toward heightened scrutiny—but also, unlike racial minorities, share a trait
which is not always or generally irrelevant to governmental decision
making. Intermediate scrutiny would be sufficient to strike down the
benefits restrictions in Diaz and Graham, since neither the state nor the
federal government would likely be able to assert an interest important
enough to justify its residency requirement. 277 But true immigration
laws—which necessarily must discriminate based on citizenship—would
survive intermediate scrutiny, since the importance of the federal
government’s interest in regulating entry is constitutionally decreed.
A shift of this sort to interest-limiting noncongruence proves revisionary
insofar as it would lead not just to a different outcome in Diaz, but to a
consistent level of scrutiny given to alienage discrimination at all levels of
government. At the same time, it would retain the existing case law’s
emphasis on the federal government’s distinctive interest in controlling
immigration. And, importantly, it would allow—as the current case law
does—that parallel federal and state cases like Diaz and Graham could, at
least in principle, come out differently. They could do so precisely because
of differences in the interests assertable at the two levels of government.
To provide more specific examples:
states, unlike the federal
government, might not be able to assert interests in preventing lawfully
admitted aliens from entering the state; encouraging naturalization;
discouraging unlawful immigration; conducting foreign policy; and
preserving federal resources. 278 Of course, the exclusively federal nature of
any of these individual interests could be contested—as Judith Resnik has
done, for example, by showing the dynamic boundaries of authority in
federations like the contemporary United States, where even the authorities
themselves (nation, states, cities, as well as translocal and transnational

277. On the other hand, a shift from strict to intermediate scrutiny at the state level would
make state alienage-based affirmative action programs—preferences for noncitizens in areas
such as university admissions—more likely to survive constitutional challenge.
278. This list of interests is adapted from Koh, supra note 190, at 101 & n.247.
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organizations) are overlapping and in constant flux. 279 Particularly in the
immigration and alienage context, the increasing intermingling of federal
and state authority over immigration enforcement and the devolution of
federal policymaking authority in areas like welfare make it nearly
impossible to separate neatly what is federal from what is state—as
traditional scrutiny-varying noncongruence in alienage law requires. 280 In
an era of immigration federalism, the states and the federal government
might increasingly be able to assert equivalent interests.
The political function cases provide other examples where federal and
state governments share common interests in making distinctions based on
alienage. Both sovereigns share a “constitutional responsibility for the
establishment and operation of [their] own government, as well as the
qualifications of an appropriately designated class of public office
holders.” 281 As Justice Blackmun described in Sugarman, this class
encompasses “persons holding state elective or important nonelective
executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate
directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy
perform functions that go to the heart of representative government.”282
For alienage restrictions to survive in these cases, lower scrutiny is not
necessarily needed; alienage laws regarding political functions could
survive simply because the state has a greater interest to assert in regard to
them than it did in welfare cases like Graham or civil service cases like
Sugarman. Interest-limiting noncongruence thus retains some of the
current contours of alienage law even as it alters and clarifies others.
2. Effects on Marriage
The state marriage cases present a different question. There, unlike in the
alienage context, the issue is not “Which of these cases should come out
differently?” but rather: “How should the reasoning in these cases change
and why does it matter?”
In the post-Windsor challenges to state same-sex marriage bans, interestlimiting noncongruence would look like something like the following.
Courts would decide what level of scrutiny discrimination based on sexual
orientation should receive. Looking to the Supreme Court on this question
would provide limited help, other than to show that fully deferential rational
basis review is not appropriate. For present purposes, the important point is
that the level of scrutiny courts identify in Windsor, whatever it is, would
not be lessened simply because Windsor looked at a federal law under the
279. Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms and Norms:
Contesting Rights, DeEssentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in NOMOS LV:
FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 363 (2014).
280. See, e.g., Gregory T. W. Rosenberg, Alienating Aliens: Equal Protection Violations
in the Structures of State Public-Benefit Schemes, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417 (2014);
Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001).
281. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973).
282. Id. at 647.
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Fifth Amendment, while the state cases examine state laws under the
Fourteenth. (This is interest-limiting, not scrutiny-varying noncongruence,
after all.) After the courts chose the level of scrutiny, states would have to
show that the interests served by their marriage restrictions were sufficient
to survive that scrutiny. This, finally, is where Windsor would be
distinguishable. Interests that were unavailable to the federal government
in Windsor might, given our federal structure, still be assertable by the
states. Thus, while the national government could not claim an interest in
preserving the historic definition of marriage, for example, or upholding
traditional morality, the states would remain free to do so.
Whether doing so would allow the states to win is, of course, another
story. An interest may well be assertable but discounted for other reasons.
It could be found pretextual, for example, or too closely tied to religion.
Similarly, the interest might not be related tightly enough to the means
chosen to advance it. This is the tailoring or “fit” problem on which many
of the states’ procreation arguments have floundered.283
Since Windsor, the various interests asserted by the states or their amici
in support of their same-sex marriage bans have repeatedly failed to survive
even rational basis review. To date, only one federal court has found any of
the asserted interests sufficient to survive equal protection scrutiny. 284
But if the outcomes in the overwhelming majority of the cases decided so
far are right—and I think they are—why does it matter that they are reached
without giving Windsor’s federalism its due? Pausing to be clear about the
risks: the embrace of noncongruence—allowing federalism into equal
protection analysis—would distinguish Windsor from its successors. It
would make the state marriage cases harder for plaintiffs to win than
Windsor was. It would require courts considering state laws to stop and
consider governmental interests that the Windsor Court was safely able to
ignore. Since I am in complete agreement with the outcome of nearly all of
the state marriage cases to date, the burden is clearly on me to offer reasons
why a tougher route to the same end is worth the trouble. I conclude by
offering several.
The first and surely most predictable reason is that interest-limiting
noncongruence simply makes better sense of Windsor than cases to date
have done. As I have already shown, assuming the congruence principle
renders federalism utterly superfluous in Windsor—and in equal protection
law generally, aside from those few cases in which categorical federalism
arguments would preclude equal protection analysis of a federal law
entirely. I take it as an axiom of interpretation that a reading which leaves
out a significant part of an opinion—particularly a part that its author says
283. Courts have repeatedly discounted claims linking marriage to procreation and child
rearing, since states do not require opposite-sex couples to be fertile or disallow gay couples
from raising kids. See, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 478–79 (E.D. Va. 2014).
284. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, No. 13-5090, 2014 WL 4347099, at *5–6 (E.D. La. Sept. 3,
2014) (holding that Louisiana’s same-sex marriage ban serves legitimate interests in “linking
children to an intact family formed by their biological parents” and ensuring that
“fundamental social change” be “cultivated through democratic consensus”).
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is “of central relevance” 285—is a worse reading than one that incorporates
the whole. This is especially true of the federalism and equal protection
aspects of Windsor, which Justice Kennedy referred to at oral argument as
“intertwined.” 286
Second, the noncongruent reading of Windsor allows for a more coherent
equal protection doctrine—one that highlights the connections between the
often-forgotten alienage cases and current controversies. Significantly,
reincorporating the alienage cases back into mainstream equal protection
doctrine would also provide an opportunity to revisit their reasoning,
allowing for them to be adapted to an immigration landscape in which
federal-state distinctions are no longer as sharp as they once were.
Intellectual coherence is nice, of course, but it matters more if the less
coherent alternatives are dangerous. This brings me to my third point. If
Windsor’s federalism is not seen to make equal protection analysis
noncongruent, then it is liable to be put to another task. For one thing, it
could be weighed against equality. Courts’ talk of balancing federalism and
equal protection in the state marriage cases has so far led nowhere, but the
framing is misguided, 287 and we should fear the judge who thinks that the
scales could ever tip in favor of states’ rights. The problem with the
balancing approach is that although it always makes, or should make,
federalism interests irrelevant, the importance of states’ rights makes
misapplication of the balancing test a temptation. Noncongruence avoids
this dilemma by giving federalism real weight within equal protection
analysis.
The other possible use for Windsor’s federalism has it doing its work
outside the doctrine, behind the scenes. In short, federalism talk becomes
merely a way of buying time for “the second, state-law shoe to be dropped
later,” as Justice Scalia wrote in angry dissent.288 According to one
proponent of this view, Professor Neil Siegel, Windsor’s federalism is a
“way station”—a type of temporizing rhetoric used “in times of transition,
when the country is in flux and the Court wants to nudge a national
conversation in a certain direction rather than end it.”289 This is to say that
Windsor’s talk of federalism is a red herring; the distinction it purports to
draw between DOMA and state marriage laws is not a genuine difference.
Windsor’s federalism is a lie, even if a noble one.

285. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
286. Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-307_jnt1.pdf (“I
think we are assuming now that there is Federal power and asking about the degree of
scrutiny that applies to it. Or are we going back to whether there is a Federal power? They
are—they are intertwined.”).
287. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013) (inaccurately
describing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), as having “balance[ed] the state’s right to
regulate marriage against the individual’s right to equal protection and due process under the
law”).
288. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
289. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 7.
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I have two worries about this account. First, it feeds directly into—even
if it does not necessarily share—the cynicism and distrust, so corrosive to
rule of law values, that lie at the heart of Justice Scalia’s critique of the
Court’s opinion in Windsor. 290 The implication of Professor Siegel’s
interpretation, stated more directly by Justice Scalia, is that the Court has
erected a rhetorical smokescreen to be blown away as soon as the cover of
federalism is no longer needed. Federalism is used purely instrumentally;
the Court’s actual words are not worthy of reliance.
Second, the cynical reading of Windsor, even if it is true, is useless to
lower courts. District and appellate courts cannot say in their opinions that
the Supreme Court was obfuscating in Windsor when it wrote of
federalism’s central relevance. Nor can they suggest that Windsor’s
federalism was merely a temporizing nudge in the national conversation
over same-sex marriage. Professors and dissenting Justices can always
second-guess a majority’s motives and an opinion’s staying power, but
lower courts are in the business of following what the Supreme Court
writes. Unlike the temporizing account, noncongruence can help courts go
about their business. My noncongruent reading of Windsor is an
interpretation of the opinion the Court actually gave us, not a prediction of
opinions possibly yet to come.
Finally, in addition to its intellectual coherence and its superiority to
competing accounts, the incorporation of federalism values into equal
protection analysis—the approach I urge in the state marriage cases—
promises to give even greater force to whatever victories the plaintiffs in
those cases eventually achieve. To date, courts have validated plaintiffs’
equal protection rights only by putting federalism values aside. The return
of noncongruent equal protection opens up a different possibility. By
including within their equal protection scrutiny certain interests that are
unique to the states, courts would be able to declare that marriage equality
claims should prevail even accounting for federalism. Distinguishing the
state marriage cases from Windsor, courts would underscore how states’
rights can be heard, and prove relevant, even in cases where the equality
principle ultimately wins out.
Recognizing the noncongruence in Windsor—and hearing in its
“federalism noises” echoes of the noncongruence of the alienage cases—
would allow courts to honor the structural differences between state and
federal governments in their responsibilities concerning marriage. Perhaps
as importantly, it would allow courts to treat Windsor’s own discussion of
such differences as something more than muddled confusion, or misleading
obfuscation. In the end, an equal protection in which structural concerns
are truly made to matter is one whose protections are all the more
constitutionally meaningful.

290. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (“It takes real cheek for today’s majority to assure
us, as it is going out the door, that a constitutional requirement to give formal recognition to
same-sex marriage is not at issue here. . . . I promise you this: The only thing that will
‘confine’ the Court’s holding is its sense of what it can get away with.”).

